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ABSTRACT
Distributed systems are ubiquitous today: from the Internet used by billions of people around the world to the small scale IoT devices. With this rapidly increasing
need to perform computation at scales larger than ever before, comes the need to
ensure resilience to adversarial failures so that these systems can continue to behave
as intended even when some malicious tampering happens.
In this dissertation, we explore the power of randomness and the difficulty of
rationally approximating the Golden Ratio to thwart adversarial behavior in two
different problems in distributed computing: interactive communication and robust
collaborative search. While randomness helps with unpredictable behavior which
protects against adversarial tampering on the communication channels, the Golden
Ratio offers uniform spreading which helps locate the target faster.
For interactive communication among a group of nodes, we consider an omniscient
adversary that flips an unknown number of bits on the channels between the nodes.
We first provide an algorithm for only a single message that needs to be sent between two parties. We then extend our result to the general multiparty case, where
our algorithm efficiently simulates any asynchronous noise-free protocol into a robust
synchronous protocol, sending asymptotically optimal number of bits.
Next, we discuss an algorithm for a multi-agent collaborative search on a plane
for a target, when the agents can experience adversarial crash failures. This is the
vii

well-known Ants Nearby Treasure Search (ANTS) problem, introduced by Feinerman
et al earlier this decade. While the problem they consider is only for the case of a
point target and no failures, we consider foraging for an adversarially placed shape
of unknown diameter, located at an unknown distance, where certain agents can
experience crash failures at any point during the algorithm. We provide lower bounds
for this problem and prove that our solution is optimal for the class of spoke algorithms
– ones in which the agents move radially away and back to the nest. Our result is one
of the first to provide scalable robustness guarantees in this setting. Our key tool is
here to exploit the difficulty in rationally approximating the Golden Ratio to spread
out the search trajectories for the agents. This not only ensures that the shape is
located faster, but we also obtain resilience against arbitrary many crash failures in
the system.
Finally, we discuss a problem closely related to the ANTS problem, called Central
Place Foraging (CPF). In this problem, the searchers search in a bounded arena
around a nest and are allowed communication through pheromones. Moreover, the
distribution of food around the nest is assumed to follow some probability distribution,
and biological factors like the effects of depletion of food resources and preferential
search in areas where food was previously found are important factors. We analyze
three well known algorithms for this problem and report their expected runtimes. We
validate our claims using experimental simulations in ARGoS.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Guaranteeing robustness against failures and malicious behavior is an important requirement of any distributed system. When the number of these failures and the
amount of malicious tampering is unknown in advance, it becomes challenging to
balance the overall resource cost with the resilience that can be guaranteed. In this
dissertation, we discuss two problems to demonstrate our techniques in defending
against different types of powerful adversaries, while guaranteeing scalability. We exploit the benefits of randomness and properties of the Golden Ratio to achieve our
desired resilience. On a high level, we use (1) the unpredictability provided by using
random bits, and (2) the uniform spread resulting from the difficulty in rationally
approximating the Golden Ratio, to our advantage.
Interactive Communication. We first discuss the problem of Interactive communication, in which a group of n players, connected by point-to-point channels,
want to simulate some distributed protocol. While many results are known for this
problem, our algorithms optimize the resource costs for the case when the amount
of adversarial tampering on the channels and the protocol length is unknown in advance. Our algorithm can simulate any noise-free asynchronous multi-party protocol
P of unknown length L into a robust synchronous protocol P 0 that tolerates an unknown number T of adversarial bit flips. Given any ε > 0, our algorithm P 0 succeeds


+ T bits, where
with probability at least 1 − ε and sends only O L 1 + α1 log nL
ε
1

α > 0 is the average message size (also unknown) in P. Thus, when α is large, the
number of bits sent in P 0 is optimal up to a constant. Our key tool in obtaining this
result is ensuring that the cost of corruption is high through the use of an Algebraic
Manipulation Detection (AMD) code and Error-Correcting Codes (ECC). Our careful
setting of different encoding parameters helps achieve a resource-competitive result
for this problem and demonstrates the power of the unpredictability in thwarting
adversarial behavior in our setting.
Robust Collaborative Search. To demonstrate how the properties of an irrational number, the Golden Ratio, can help guarantee robustness, we study the
well-known Ants Nearby Treasure Search (ANTS) problem, introduced by Feinerman
et al in [44]. In particular, we provide an algorithm for N searchers to efficiently
forage a convex target shape, which is placed adversarially at an unknown distance
L from a central location. For a shape of unknown diameter D, our algorithm takes,



2
log
L
time steps, where t < N is the number of
in expectation, O L + L N(t+1)
D
searchers that experience adversarial crash failures during the algorithm. We show
that among the class of spoke algorithms, where searchers forage in rays emanating
from and back to the central location, our algorithm is asymptotically tight. We use
the fact that the Golden Ratio is hard to approximate rationally to achieve robustness, even when the failures are adaptively scheduled. As a side note, this property
of the Golden Ratio has been exploited to design efficient hashing algorithms [70] and
to design optimal schedules for security games [67]. To the best of our knowledge,
our algorithm is one of the first to achieve robustness against arbitrarily many crash
failures in the setting of natural distributed algorithms.
Bio-inspired Central Place Foraging. Finally, motivated by the applications
of our results to real biological and bio-inspired systems like swarm robots, we discuss
a problem closely related to the ANTS problem, called Central Place Foraging (CPF).
In this problem, the searchers search in a bounded arena around a nest and are allowed communication through pheromones. Moreover, the distribution of food around
the nest is assumed to follow some probability distribution, and biological factors like
2

the effects of depletion of food resources and preferential search in areas where food
was previously found are important factors. Empirical work in real robots leads us
to investigate three simple algorithms for this problem: the Distributed Archimedean
Spiral Algorithm (SpiralCPFA) [49, 97], the Spoke-based Central Place Foraging
Algorithm (SpokeCPFA) [1], and the Randomized Central Place Foraging Algorithm
(RandCPFA) [77]. Our formal analysis allows us to predict the performance of these
CPFAs for large areas and swarms of robots for which experiments are currently impractical. To aid our analysis, we introduce the price of ignorance metric. This metric
is the ratio of the performance of a given algorithm to that of an idealised omniscient
algorithm. This quantifies the penalty paid by each algorithm for not knowing target
locations, which for the complete collection task is the major determinant of CPFA
performance. Our preliminary results using this metric appeared in [?] and the full
paper is scheduled to appear in [7].

Dissertation Organization. We organize this dissertation into multiple chapters.
We begin with discussing the problem of interactive communication and our solution
for sending a single message between two-parties in Chapter 2. We generalize this
result to the case of arbitrary asynchronous multiparty protocols in Chapter 3. We
introduce the Robust ANTS problem in Chapter 4, where we give our algorithm to
handle crash failures and establish the tightness of our results using lower bounds.
In Chapter 5, we present some empirical and theoretical analysis of Central Place
Foraging Algorithms. Finally, we conclude and discuss some open problems that
emanate from our research in Chapter 6.

3

Chapter 2
Two-Party Interactive
Communication
What if we want to send a message over a noisy two-way channel, and little is known
in advance? In particular, imagine that Alice wants to send a message to Bob, but the
number of bits flipped on the channel is unknown to either Alice or Bob in advance.
Further, the length of Alice’s message is also unknown to Bob in advance. While this
scenario seems like it would occur quite frequently, surprisingly little is known about
it.
In this chapter, we describe an algorithm to efficiently address this problem. To do
so, we make a critical assumption on the type of noise on the channel. We assume that
an adversary flips bits on the channel, but this adversary is not completely omniscient.
The adversary knows our algorithm and Alice’s message, but it does not know the
private random bits of Alice and Bob, nor the bits that are sent over the channel,
except when these bits do not depend on the random bits of Alice and Bob. Some
assumption like this is necessary : if the adversary knows all bits sent on the channel
and the number of bits it flips is unknown in advance, then no algorithm can succeed
with better than constant probability. Essentially, in this case, the adversary can run
a man-in-the-middle attack to fool Bob into accepting the wrong message.
Theorem 1 (Restatement of Theorem 6.1 from [34]). Consider any algorithm for
4

interactive communication over a public channel that works with unknown number of
adversarial bit flips and always terminates in the noise-free case. Any such algorithm
succeeds with probability at most 1/2.
Our algorithm assumes that a desired error probability, δ > 0 is known to both
Alice and Bob, that the adversary flips some number T bits that is finite but unknown
in advance, and that the length of Alice’s message, L is unknown to Bob in advance.
Our main result is then summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Our algorithm tolerates an unknown number of adversarial errors, T ,
and for any δ > 0, succeeds in sending a message of length L with probability at least




bits.
1 − δ, and sends an expected L + O T + min T + 1, logL L log Lδ
An interesting case to consider is when the error probability is polynomially small
in L, i.e., when δ = O(1/Lc ), for some constant c. Then when T = o(L/ log L), our
algorithm sends L + o(L) expected bits. When T = Ω(L), the number of bits sent is
L + O (T ), which is asymptotically optimal.

2.1

Related Work

Interactive Communication. Our work is related to the area of interactive communication. The problem of interactive communication asks how two parties can run a
protocol π over a noisy channel. This problem was first posed by Schulman [104, 103],
who describes a deterministic method for simulating interactive protocols on noisy
channels with only a constant-factor increase in the total communication complexity. This initial work spurred vigorous interest in the area (see [24] for an excellent
survey).
Schulman’s scheme tolerates an adversarial noise rate of 1/240, even if the adversary is not oblivious. It critically depends on the notion of a tree code for which
an exponential-time construction was originally provided. This exponential construction time motivated work on more efficient constructions [25, 94, 87]. There were
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also efforts to create alternative codes [52, 92]. Recently, elegant computationallyefficient schemes that tolerate a constant adversarial noise rate have been demonstrated [22, 54]. Additionally, a large number of results have improved the tolerable
adversarial noise rate [23, 28, 55, 47, 26], as well as tuning the communication costs
to a known, but not necessarily constant, adversarial noise rate [58].
Interactive Communication with Private Channels. Our algorithm builds on
a recent result on interactive communication by Dani et al [34]. The model in [34] is
equivalent to the one in this chapter except that 1) they assume that Alice and Bob
are running an arbitrary protocol π; and 2) they assume that both Alice and Bob
know the number of bits sent in π. In particular, similar to this result, they assume
that the adversary flips an unknown number of bits T , and that the adversary does
not know the private random bits of Alice and Bob, or the bits sent over the channel.
If the protocol π just sends L bits from Alice to Bob, then the algorithm by Dani
et al [34] can solve the problem we consider here. This algorithm sends an expected

p
L(T + 1) log L + T bits, with a probability of error that is O(1/Lc ) for any
L+O
fixed constant c.
For the same probability of error, the algorithm in this chapter sends an expected
L + O(min((T + 1) log L), L) + T ) bits. This is never worse than [34], and can be
significantly better. For example, when T = O(1), our cost is L + O(log L) versus


√
L+O( L log L) from [34]. In general if T = o logL L our cost is asymptotically better
than [34]. Additionally, unlike [34], the algorithm in this chapter does not assume
that L is known in advance by Bob.
Rateless Codes. Rateless error correcting codes enable generation of potentially
an infinite number of encoding symbols from a given set of source symbols with the
property that given any subset of a sufficient number of encoding symbols, the original
source symbols can be recovered. Fountain codes [82, 86] and LT codes [93, 80, 59] are
two classic examples of rateless codes. Erasure codes employ feedback for stopping
transmission [93, 80] and for error detection [59] at the receiver.
Critically, the feedback channel, i.e., the channel from Bob to Alice, is typically
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assumed to be noise free. We differ from this model in that we allow noise on the
feedback channel, and additionally, we tolerate bit flips, while most rateless codes
tolerate only bit erasures.

2.2

Formal Model

Initial State We assume that Alice initially knows some message M of length L bits
that she wants to communicate to Bob, and that both Alice and Bob know an error
tolerance parameter δ > 0. However, Bob does not know L or any other information
about M initially. Alice and Bob are connected by a two-way binary communication
channel.

The Adversary We assume an adversary can flip some a priori unknown, but
finite number of bits T on the channel from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice. This
adversary knows M , and all of our algorithms. However, it does not know any random
bits generated by Alice or Bob, or the bits sent over the channel, except when these
can be determined from other known information.

Channel steps We assume that communication over the channel is synchronous.
A channel step is defined as the amount of time that it takes to send one bit over the
channel. As is standard in distributed computing, we assume that all local computation is instantaneous.

Silence on the channel Similar to [34], when neither Alice nor Bob sends in a
channel step, we say that the channel is silent. In any contiguous sequence of silent
channel steps, the bit received on the channel in the first step is set by the adversary
for free. By default, the bit received in the subsequent steps of the sequence remains
the same, unless the adversary pays for one bit flip each time it wants to change the
value of the bit received.
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2.3

Known L

We first discuss the case when Bob knows L. We remove this assumption later in
Section 2.5.
Our algorithm makes critical use of Reed-Solomon codes from [99]. Alice begins
by encoding her message using a polynomial of degree d = dL/ log qe−1 over the finite
field GF (q), where q = 2dlog Le . She sends the values of this polynomial computed at
certain elements of the field as message symbols to Bob. Upon receiving an appropriate number of these points, Bob computes the polynomial using the Berlekamp-Welch
algorithm [111] and sends a fingerprint of his guess to Alice. Upon hearing this fingerprint, if Alice finds no errors, she echoes the fingerprint back to Bob, upon receiving
a correct copy of which, Bob terminates the algorithm. Unless the adversary corrupts
many bits, Alice terminates soon after.
However, in the case where Alice does not receive a correct fingerprint of the
polynomial from Bob, she sends two more evaluations of the polynomial to Bob. Bob
keeps receiving extra evaluations and recomputing the polynomial until he receives
the correct fingerprint echo from Alice.

2.3.1

Notation

Some helper functions and notation used in our algorithm are described in this section.
We denote by s ∈u.a.r. S the fact that s is sampled uniformly at random from the set
S.

Fingerprinting For fingerprinting, we use a well known theorem by Naor and Naor
[90], slightly reworded as follows:
Theorem 3. [90] Fix integer ` > 0 and real p ∈ (0, 1). Then there exist constants
Cs , Ch > 0 and algorithm h such that the following hold for a given string s ∈u.a.r.
{0, 1}Cs log(`/p) .
1. For a string m of length at most `, we have h (s, m, p, `) = (s, f ), where f is a
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string of length Ch log(1/p).
2. For any bit strings m and m0 of length at most `, if m = m0 , then h (s, m, p, `) =
h (s, m0 , p, `), else Pr{h (s, m, p, `) = h (s, m0 , p, `)} ≤ p.
We refer to h (s, m, p, `) as the fingerprint of the message m.
GetPolynomial Let M be a multiset of tuples of the form (x, y) ∈ GF (q)×GF (q).
For each x ∈ GF (q), we define maj(M)(x) to be the tuple (x, z) that has the highest number of occurrences in M, breaking ties arbitrarily. We define maj(M) =
S
x∈GF (q) {(x, maj(M)(x))}. Given the set S = maj(M), we define GetPoly (S, d, q)
as a function that returns the degree-d polynomial over GF (q) that is supported by
the largest number of points in S, breaking ties arbitrarily.

The following theorem from [99] [111] provides conditions under which the function
GetPoly (S, d, q) reconstructs the required polynomial.
Theorem 4. [99] [111] Let P be a polynomial of degree d over some field F, and
S ⊂ F × F. Let g be the number of elements (x, y) ∈ S such that y = P (x), and let
b = |S| − g. Then, if g > b + d, we have GetPoly (S, d, q) = P .
Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes Our algorithm also makes use of Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes from [33]. For a given η > 0, called
the strength of AMD encoding, these codes provide three functions: amdEnc, amdDec
and IsCodeword. The function amdEnc (m, η) creates an AMD encoding of a message m. The function IsCodeword (m, η) takes a message m and returns true if and
only if there exists some message m0 such that amdEnc (m0 , η) = m. The function
amdDec (m, η) takes a message m such that IsCodeword (m, η) and returns a message
m0 such that amdEnc (m0 , η) = m. These functions enable detection of bit corruption
in an encoded message. The following (slightly reworded) theorem from [33] helps
establish this:
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Theorem 5. [33] For any η > 0, there exist functions amdEnc, amdDec and IsCodeword,
such that for any bit string m of length x:
1. amdEnc (m, η) is a string of length x + Ca log(1/η), for some constant Ca > 0
2. IsCodeword (amdEnc (m, η) , η) and amdDec (amdEnc (m, η) , η) = m
3. For any bit string s 6= 0 of length x, we have

Pr (IsCodeword (amdEnc (m, η) ⊕ s, η)) ≤ η

With the use of Naor-Naor hash functions along with AMD codes, we are able
to provide the required security for messages with Alice and Bob. Assume that
the Bob generates the fingerprint (s, f ), which upon tampering by the adversary,
is converted to (s ⊕ t1 , f ⊕ t2 ) for some strings t1 , t2 of appropriate lengths. Upon
receiving this, Alice compares it against the fingerprint of her message m by computing
h (s ⊕ t1 , m, p, |m|), for appropriately chosen p. Then, we require that there exist a
η ≥ 0 such that for any choice of t1 , t2 ,
Pr{h (s ⊕ t1 , m0 , p, |m0 |) = (s ⊕ t1 , f ⊕ t2 )} ≤ η

for any string m0 6= m. Theorem 5 provides us with this guarantee directly.

Error-correcting Codes These codes enable us to encode a message so that it can
be recovered even if the adversary corrupts a third of the bits. We will denote the
encoding and decoding functions by ecEnc and ecDec, respectively. The following
theorem, a slight restatement from [99], gives the properties of these functions.
Theorem 6. [99] There is a constant Ce > 0 such that for any message m, we have
|ecEnc (m) | ≤ Ce |m|. Moreover, if m0 differs from ecEnc (m) in at most one-third of
its bits, then ecDec (m0 ) = m.
Finally, we observe that the linearity of ecEnc and ecDec ensure that when the
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error correction is composed with the AMD code, the resulting code has the following
properties:
1. If at most a third of the bits of the message are flipped, then the original message
can be uniquely reconstructed by rounding to the nearest codeword in the range
of ecEnc.
2. Even if an arbitrary set of bits is flipped, the probability of the change not being
recognized is at most η, i.e. the same guarantee as the AMD codes.
This is because ecDec is linear, so when noise η is added by the adversary to the codeword x, effectively what happens is the decoding function ecDec (x + η) = ecDec (x)+
ecDec (η) = m+ecDec (η), where m is the AMD-encoded message. But now ecDec (η)
is an random string that is added to the AMD-encoded codeword.
Silence In our algorithm, silence on the channel has a very specific meaning. We
define the function IsSilence (s) to return true iff the string s has fewer than |s|/3
bit alternations.
Other notation We use 0b to denote the b-bit string of all zeros,

for string

concatenation and Listen (b) to denote the function that returns the bits on the
channel over the next b time steps. For the sake of convenience, we will use log x to
mean dlog2 xe, unless specified otherwise. Let C = max{19, Ch + Ca + Ce Cs } be a
constant1 .

2.3.2

Algorithm overview

Our algorithm for the case when L is known is given in two parts: Algorithm 3 is
what Alice follows and Algorithm 4 is what Bob follows. Initially, Alice computes
a degree-d polynomial encoding of M over a field of size q. Here q = 2dlog Le and
d = dL/ log qe − 1. She begins by sending evaluations of this polynomial over the
first d + 1 field elements to Bob in plaintext. Bob uses the evaluations received to
1

This particular choice of C will be clear from the analysis in Section 2.4.
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Algorithm 1 Alice’s algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

procedure Alice(M, δ)
. M is a message of length L
q ← 2dlog Le
. Field size
d ← dL/ log qe − 1
. Degree of polynomial
Pa ← degree-d polynomial encoding of M over GF (q)
Send {P (0), P (1), . . . , P (d)}
for j = 1 to ∞ do
. Rounds for the algorithm
ηj ← (1/2)bj/dc δ/6d
bj ← C log (L/ηj )
. Message size in this round
f ← ecDec (Listen (bj ))
. Fingerprint from Bob
if IsCodeword (f, ηj ) then
(s, f1 ) ← amdDec (f, ηj )
if (s, f1 ) = h (s, Pa , ηj , L) then
Send ecEnc (f )
. Echo the fingerprint
Send 0bj if the fingerprint was not echoed.
f2 ← Listen (bj )
if IsSilence (f2 ) then
Terminate
. Bob has likely left
else
Ma ← polynomial evaluation tuples of Pa at next two points of the field
(cyclically)
Send ecEnc (amdEnc (Ma , ηj ))

reconstruct a polynomial. He then computes a fingerprint of this polynomial and
sends it back to Alice. This fingerprint is encoded, using both AMD encoding and
then ECC encoding, so that 1) the fingerprint can be recovered if fewer than one third
of the bits are flipped; and 2) if more than one third of the bits are flipped, this fact
will always be detected, with failure probability over the entire algorithm less than
δ/3. If Alice receives a correct fingerprint, she echoes it back to Bob. Upon receiving
this echo, Bob reconstructs the message from his polynomial and terminates. The
channel from Bob to Alice is now silent. If Alice next receives silence on the channel
then she will also terminate. By continuing to flip bits on the channel, the adversary
can keep Alice from terminating at this point, but only at a cost to the adversary
that increases linearly with the number of channel steps that Alice’s termination is
delayed.
If the adversary flips bits on the channel so that Bob’s fingerprint mismatches,
Alice always recognizes this mismatch, with failure probability over the entire algorithm less than δ/3. She then exchanges more evaluations of her polynomial with
12

Algorithm 2 Bob’s algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:

procedure Bob(L, δ)
q ← 2dlog Le
. Field size
d ← dL/ log qe − 1
. Degree of polynomial
B←∅
. B ∈ GF (q) × GF (q)
Listen to first d + 1 evaluations from Alice
Add the corresponding polynomial evaluation tuples to B
for j = 1 to ∞ do
ηj ← (1/2)bj/dc δ/6d
bj ← C log (L/ηj )
. Message size in this round
Pb ← GetPoly (maj(B), d, q)
Sample a string s ∈u.a.r. {0, 1}Cs bj /C
fb ← amdEnc (h (s, Pb , ηj , L) , ηj )
Send ecEnc (fb )
. Send Alice the fingerprint of the polynomial
0
fb = ecDec (Listen (bj ))
. Listen to Alice’s echo
if fb0 = fb then
Terminate
else
Send a string f20 ∈u.a.r. {0, 1}bj
Receive polynomial evaluation tuples for the next two field elements
and add to B

Bob, proceeding in rounds. In each round, Alice sends two more ECC and AMD
encoded evaluations of the polynomial on the next two field elements. Bob then uses
the subroutine GetPolynomial to compute a new polynomial that best fits all evaluation he has received, and he sends a fingerprint of that polynomial back to Alice.
If Alice receives a fingerprint from Bob that matches her polynomial, she sends that
fingerprint back to Bob. If Bob receives an echo of the fingerprint he sent, he then
terminates. If Alice receives silence at this point, she also terminates. In any other
case, both Alice and Bob run another round.

2.3.3

Example Run

Figure 2.1 illustrates an example run of our protocol for the case when the adversary
corrupts one polynomial evaluation tuple in plaintext and fewer than a third of the
bits in the encoded tuples that are sent during the resend. The blue boxes represent
bits from our protocol, red boxes represent bits flipped by the adversary, and the
dark blue box emphasizes the fact that the contained bits are encoded using ECC
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Figure 2.1: Example run of our two party IC protocol.
and AMD codes.
Below is an explanation of the steps in this figure.
1. Alice begins by computing a polynomial P that encodes her message. She sends
evaluation of P on the first d + 1 field elements to Bob. These evaluations are
sent in plaintext. In this example, the adversary corrupts one of the evaluation
tuples so that the polynomial Pb that Bob reconstructs is different than P .
2. Bob computes the fingerprint of Pb , depicted as Hash(Pb ) in the figure, and
sends it to Alice. Alice compares this fingerprint against the hash of her own
polynomial, Hash(P ), and detects a mismatch.
3. In response, Alice remains silent. Bob is now convinced that his version of the
polynomial is incorrect.
4. Thus, Bob sends noise to Alice to ask her for a resend.
5. Alice encodes two more evaluations of P at the next two field elements and sends
them to Bob. In this example, the adversary tries to tamper these evaluations
by flipping some bits. However, we assume that the adversary flips fewer than
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a third of the total number of bits in the encoded evaluations. Thus, upon
decoding, Bob is able to successfully recover both evaluations. He then uses the
GetPolynomial subroutine to recompute Pb , which now matches P .
6. Bob computes Hash(Pb ) and sends it to Alice. Upon seeing this hash and
verifying that it matches Hash(P ), Alice is now convinced that Bob has the
correct copy of the polynomial, and hence, the original message.
7. Alice echoes the hash back to Bob to indicate that it is correct. Upon receiving
this, Bob extracts the message from the polynomial, based on its coefficients.
He then terminates the protocol, and so there is now silence on the channel from
Bob to Alice.
8. Alice receives silence and terminates the protocol as well.
The message has now successfully been transmitted from Alice to Bob.

2.4

Analysis

We now prove that our algorithm is correct with probability at least 1−δ, and compute
the number of bits sent. Before proceeding to the proof, we define three bad events:
1. Unintentional Silence. When Bob executes step 18 of his algorithm, the string
received by Alice is interpreted as silence.
2. Fingerprint Error. Fingerprint hash collision as per Theorem 3.
3. AMD Error. The adversary corrupts an AMD encoded message into an encoding
of a different message.
Rounds For both Alice and Bob, we define a round as one iteration of the for loop
in our algorithm. We refer to the part of the algorithm before the for loop begins
as round 0. The AMD encoding strength η is equal to δ/6d initially and decreases
by a factor of 2 every d rounds. This way, the number of bits added to the messages
increases linearly every d rounds, which enhances security against corruption.
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2.4.1

Correctness and Termination

We now prove that with probability at least 1 − δ, Bob terminates the algorithm with
the correct guess of Alice’s message.

2.4.1.1

Unintentional Silence

The following lemmas show that Alice terminates before Bob with probability at most
δ/3.
Lemma 1. For b ≥ 71, the probability that a b-bit string sampled uniformly at random
from {0, 1}b has fewer than b/3 bit alternations is at most e−b/19 .
Proof. Let s be a string sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}b , where b ≥ 71.
Denote by s[i] the ith bit of s. Let Xi be the indicator random variable for the event
that s[i] 6= s[i + 1], for 1 ≤ i < b. Note that all Xi ’s are mutually independent.
P
Let X be the number of bit alternations in s. Clearly, X = b−1
i=1 Xi , which gives
P
E(X) = b−1
i=1 E(Xi ), using the linearity of expectation. Since E(Xi ) = 1/2 for all
1 ≤ i < b, we get E(X) = (b − 1)/2. Using the multiplicative version of Chernoff
√
bounds [36] for 0 ≤ t ≤ b − 1,
√


b−1 t b−1
2
Pr X <
−
≤ e−t /2 .
2
2
To obtain Pr{X < b/3}, set t =

b−3
√
3 b−1

to get,
(b−3)2

Pr{X < b/3} ≤ e− 18(b−1) ≤ e−b/19

for b ≥ 71.

Lemma 2. Alice terminates the algorithm before Bob with probability at most δ/3.
Proof. Let ξ be the event that Alice terminates before Bob. This happens when the
string sent by Bob in step 18 after possible adversarial corruptions is interpreted as
silence by Alice. Let ξj be the event that Alice terminates before Bob in round j of
the algorithm. Then, using a union bound over the rounds, the fact that C ≥ 19 and
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Lemma 11, we get
Pr{ξ} ≤

X

=

X

Pr{ξj } ≤

j≥1

X

e−bj /19 ≤

j≥1

δ X
≤
6Ld j≥0

2−bj /19

j≥1

2−C log(L/ηj )/19 ≤

j≥1

X

X

2− log(L/ηj ) =

X

j≥1

log(ηj /L)

j≥1

 bj/dc
1
δ
δ
≤
≤
2
3L
3

Note that Lemma 11 is applicable here because for each j ≥ 1, we have bj ≥ 71. To see
this, use the fact that d ≤ 2L/ log L and δ < 1 to obtain the condition L2 ≥ 271/C /12,
which is always true because L2 > 4 > 271/C /12.

2.4.1.2

Fingerprint Failure

The following lemma proves that the fingerprint error happens with probability at
most δ/3, ensuring the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 3. Upon termination, Bob does not have the correct guess of Alice’s message
with probability at most δ/3.
Proof. Let ξ be the event that Bob does not have the correct guess of Alice’s message
upon termination. Note that in round j, from Theorem 3, the fingerprints fail with
probability at most ηj . Using a union bound over these rounds, we get
X δ  1 bj/dc δ X
δ
(1/2)j =
≤
Pr{ξ} ≤
ηj =
6d 2
6 j≥0
3
j≥1
j≥1
X

2.4.1.3

AMD Failure

Lemma 4. The probability of AMD failure is at most δ/3.
Proof. Note that in round j, from Theorem 5, AMD failure occurs with probability
at most ηj . Hence, using a union bound over the rounds, the AMD failure occurs

P
P
P
δ
1 bj/dc
with probability j≥1 ηj = j≥1 6d
≤ 6δ j≥0 (1/2)j = 3δ .
2
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2.4.2

Probability of Failure

Lemma 5. Our algorithm succeeds with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof. Lemmas 2, 18 and 4 ensure that the three bad events, as defined previously,
each happen with probability at most δ/3. Hence, using a union bound over the
occurrence of these three events, the total probability of failure of the algorithm is
at most δ. If the three bad events do not occur, then Alice will continue to send
evaluations of the polynomial until Bob has the correct message. Since T is finite,
Bob will eventually have the correct message and terminate.

2.4.3

Cost to the algorithm

Recall that Alice and Bob compute their polynomials Pa and Pb , respectively, over
GF (q). We refer to every (x, y) ∈ GF (q) × GF (q) that Bob stores after receiving
the evaluation y, that has potentially been tampered with, of the polynomial Pa at
x from Alice as a polynomial evaluation tuple. We call a polynomial evaluation tuple
(x, y) in Bob’s set B good if Pa (x) = y and bad otherwise.

We begin by stating two important lemmas that relate the number of bits flipped
by the adversary to make m polynomial evaluation tuples bad to the number of bits
required to send them.
Lemma 6. Let f (m) be the number of bits flipped by the adversary to make m polynomial evaluation tuples bad. Then, f (m) ≥ m if m ≤ d + 1, and
C
f (m) ≥ (d + 1) +
6



(m − d − 3)2
(m − d − 1) log(6Ld/δ) +
4d

otherwise.
Proof. Let m = m1 + m2 , where m1 ≤ d + 1 is the number of polynomial evaluation
tuples that were not encoded and m2 is the number of AMD and error-encoded polynomial evaluation tuples. Clearly, f (m1 ) = m1 . Each of the remaining m2 polynomial
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evaluation tuples are sent in pairs, one pair per round. Since the adversary needs to
flip at least a third of the number of bits for each encoded polynomial evaluation tuple
to make it bad, we have
m2 /2
1X
f (m) ≥ m1 +
bj
3 j=1


  
m2 /2 
6Ld
j
C X
log
+
= m1 +
3 j=1
δ
d




C
6Ld
(m2 − 2)2
≥ m1 +
m2 log
+
6
δ
4d
Since the number of bits per polynomial evaluation tuple increases monotonically, the
expression above becomes f (m) ≥ m if m ≤ d + 1, and
C
f (m) ≥ (d + 1) +
6



(m − d − 3)2
(m − d − 1) log(6Ld/δ) +
4d

otherwise.
Lemma 7. Let g(m) be the number of bits required to send m polynomial evaluation
tuples, where m ≥ d + 1. Then,

g(m) ≤ L + 5C

(m − d − 1)
(m − d + 1)2
log(6Ld/δ) +
2
8d


.

Proof. If m < d + 1, then we have g(m) = m log q ≤ L, since each of these m
polynomial evaluation tuples is of length log q. For m > d + 1, taking into account
the fact that each round involves exchange of at most 5 messages between Alice and
Bob, we get
(m−d−1)/2

g(m) ≤ L + 5

X

bj

j=1
(m−d−1)/2 

X

= L + 5C



log

j=1


≤ L + 5C

6Ld
δ



 
j
+
d

(m − d − 1)
(m − d + 1)2
log(6Ld/δ) +
2
8d
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Lemma 8. Let L ≥ 3, and r be any round at the end of which Pb 6= Pa . Then the
number of bad polynomial evaluation tuples through round r is at least r/4.
Proof. We call a field element x ∈ GF (q) good if (x, Pa (x)) ∈ maj(B), and bad otherwise. Let ge be the number of good field elements and be be the number of bad field
elements up to round r. Similarly, let gt be the number of good polynomial evaluation tuples and bt be the number of bad polynomial evaluation tuples up to round
r. Then, from Theorem 4, we must have be ≥ ge − d. Note that the total number
of field elements for which Bob has received polynomial evaluation tuples from Alice
through round r is be + ge = min(d + 2r + 1, q). Adding this equality to the previous
inequality, we have
be ≥

1
min (2r + 1, q − d) .
2

(2.1)

The total number of polynomial evaluation tuples received by Bob up to round r
is given by
bt + gt = d + 2r + 1.

(2.2)

j
k
t
Note that every bad field element is associated with at least 2(bbte+g
polynomial
+ge )
j
k
t
evaluation tuples. This gives bt ≥ be 2(bbte+g
. Using this inequality with Eqs. (2.1)
+ge )
and (2.2), we have


1
d + 2r + 1
bt ≥ min(2r + 1, q − d)
2
2 min(d + 2r + 1, q)


1
d + 2r + 1
≥
min(2r + 1, q − d)
2 2 min(d + 2r + 1, q)

(2.3)

Case I: (d + 2r + 1 ≤ q) For this case, we have




1
d + 2r + 1
1 2r + 1
r
min(2r + 1, q − d) =
≥
2 2 min(d + 2r + 1, q)
2
2
4
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(2.4)

Case II: (d + 2r + 1 > q) For this case, we have




d + 2r + 1
1 (d + 2r + 1)(q − d)
1
min(2r + 1, q − d) =
2 2 min(d + 2r + 1, q)
2
2q



1 2r + 1
d
≥
1−
2
2
q
r
≥
4

(2.5)

where the last inequality holds since d/q ≤ 1/3 for L ≥ 3.

Combining Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5), we get bt ≥ r/4.
We now state a lemma that is crucial to the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 9. If Bob terminates before Alice, the total number of bits sent by our algorithm is



 
L
L
L + O T + min T + 1,
log
.
log L
δ
Proof. Let r0 be the last round at the end of which Pb 6= Pa , or 0 if Pb = Pa at the
end of round 1 and for all subsequent rounds. Let T1 be the number of bits corrupted
by the adversary through round r0 . Let A1 represent the total cost through round
r0 and A2 be the cost of the algorithm after round r0 . Note that after round r0 , the
adversary must corrupt one of either (1) the fingerprint, or (2) its echo, or (3) silence
on the channel in Step 15 of Alice’s algorithm, in every round to delay termination.
Also, after round r0 , Alice and Bob must exchange at least a fingerprint and an echo
even if T = 0. Thus, we have,

A2 = O(T + log(L/δ))

(2.6)

Recall that the number of polynomial evaluation tuples sent up to round r0 is
d + 2r0 + 1. Then, from Lemma 7, we have
A1 ≤ g(d + 2r0 + 1)


(r0 + 1)2
0
.
≤ L + 5C r log(6Ld/δ) +
2d
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(2.7)

From Lemma 8, we have that the number of bad polynomial evaluation tuples is at
least dr0 /4e. Thus, from Lemma 6, we have T1 ≥ f (dr0 /4e), which implies T1 ≥ r0 /4
if r0 /4 ≤ d + 1. Otherwise, we have
C
T1 ≥ (d + 1) +
6



(r0 /4 − d + 3)2
0
(r /4 − d − 1) log(6Ld/δ) +
4d

(2.8)

Case I : (r0 /4 ≤ d + 1) Since T1 is at least the number of bad polynomial evaluation
tuples, from Lemma 8, we have T1 ≥ r0 /4, which gives r0 ≤ min(4T1 , 4(d + 1)). Hence,
using Eq (2.7), we get,


(r0 + 1)2
0
A1 ≤ L + 5C r log(6Ld/δ) +
2d


(4d + 5)2
≤ L + 5C min(4T1 , 4(d + 1)) log(6Ld/δ) +
2d




L
L
= L + O min T1 ,
log(L/δ) +
log L
log L

(2.9)

where the last equality holds because d ≤ L/ log L + 1.

Case II : (r0 /4 > d + 1) From Eq. (2.8), we have
C
T1 ≥ (d + 1) +
6



(r0 /4 − d + 3)2
(r /4 − d − 1) log(6Ld/δ) +
4d
0


.

(2.10)

Since each summand in the inequality above is positive and C > 6, we get (r0 /4 − d −
1) log(6Ld/δ) ≤ T1 , which gives
r0 log(6Ld/δ) ≤ 4T1 + 4(d + 1) log(6Ld/δ).

Since

(r0 /4−d+3)2
4d

(2.11)

√
≤ T1 , we have r0 ≤ 8 T1 d + 4d − 12. Building on this, we get,
2
√
8 T1 d + 4d − 11
(r0 + 1)2
≤
2d
2d
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(2.12)

Hence, from Eqs. (2.7), (2.11) and (2.12) , we get


(r0 + 1)2
0
A1 ≤ L + 5C r log(6Ld/δ) +
2d

2 !
√
8 T1 d + 4d − 11
≤ L + 5C 4T1 + 4(d + 1) log(6Ld/δ) +
2d




L
= L + O T1 +
log(L/δ)
log L

(2.13)

where the last equality holds because d ≤ L/ log L + 1 and T1 ≥ d + 1 from inequality (2.10).

Combining Eqs. (2.6), (2.9) and (2.13), the total number of bits sent by the algorithm becomes

 

L
L
log
A1 + A2 = L + O T + min T + 1,
log L
δ


Putting it all together, we are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 7. Our algorithm tolerates an unknown number of adversarial errors, T ,
and for a given δ ∈ (0, 1), succeeds with probability at least 1 − δ, and sends L +




L
L
O T + min T + 1, log L log δ
bits.
Proof. By Lemmas 5, with probability at least 1 − δ, Bob terminates before Alice
with the correct message. If this happens, then by Lemma 9, the total number of bits
sent is

 


L
L
log
L + O T + min T + 1,
log L
δ

2.5

Unknown L

We now discuss an algorithm for the case when the message length L is unknown to
Bob. The only parameter now known to both Alice and Bob is δ.
Our main idea is to make use of an algorithm from [2], which enables Alice to send
23

a message of unknown length to Bob in our model, but is inefficient.

2

We thus use a

two phase approach. First, we send the length of the message M (i.e., a total of log L
bits) from Alice to Bob using the algorithms of [2]. Second, once Bob learns the value
L, we use the algorithm from Section 2.3 to communicate the message M . We will
show that the total number of bits sent by this two phase algorithm is asymptotically
similar to the case when the message length is known by Bob in advance.

2.5.1

Algorithm Overview

Let π1 be a noise-free protocol in which Alice sends L to Bob, who is unaware of the
length (log L in this case) of the message. Let π2 be a noise-free protocol in which
Alice sends M to Bob, who knows the length L = |M | a priori. W can write the
noise-free protocol π to communicate M from Alice to Bob, who does not know L,
as a composition of π1 and π2 in this order. Let π10 , π20 and π 0 be the simulations of
π1 , π2 and π, respectively, that are robust to adversarial bit flipping.
To simulate π 0 with desired error probability δ > 0, we proceed in two steps. We
first make π1 robust with δ1 = δ/2 error tolerance using Algorithm 3 from [2], setting
n = 2. Then, we make π2 robust with δ2 = δ/2 error tolerance using Algorithms 3
and 4. This way, when we compose the robust versions of π1 and π2 , we get π 0
with error probability at most δ1 + δ2 = δ (by union bound). The correctness of π 0
immediately follows from the correctness of π10 and π20 , by construction.

2.5.2

Probability of Failure

The failure events for π 0 are exactly the failure events for π10 and π20 . In other words,
we say π 0 fails when one or both of π10 and π20 fail. Thus, the failure probability of π 0
is at most δ/2 + δ/2 = δ, by a simple union bound over the two sub-protocols.
2

We refer the reader to [2] for details on this algorithm; we discuss only its use in this chapter.
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2.5.3

Number of bits sent

To analyze the number of bits sent, let T1 be the number of bits flipped by the
adversary in π10 and T2 be the number of bits flipped by the adversary in π20 . Recall
that the length of the message from Alice to Bob in π10 is log L and that in π20 is L.
Let A1 be the number of bits sent in π10 and A2 be the number of bits sent in π20 .
Thus, using Theorem 1.1(2) from [2] (with n = 2, L = log L, T = T1 , δ1 = δ/2 and
α = 1), we get
A1 = O (log L · log log L + T1 )
Similarly, using Theorem 7 from this chapter (with δ2 = δ/2), we get

A2 = L + O (T2 + min (T2 + 1, L/ log L) log L))

Using T = T1 + T2 , the total number of bits sent by π 0 is then A1 + A2 = L +
O (T + min (T + 1, L/ log L) log L). The proof of Theorem 2 now follows directly from
the above analysis.
Note that another approach to sending a message of unknown length from Alice
to Bob would have been to directly use the algorithm in [2] with n = 2. However, this
would have incurred a higher blowup than the approach that we take in this chapter.
More specifically, when T is small, the direct use of the multiparty algorithm gives a
multiplicative logarithmic blowup in the number of bits, while our current approach
maintains the constant overall blowup in the number of bits by using the heavy weight
protocol for the length of the message instead (which is exponentially smaller than
the message).
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Chapter 3
Multiparty Interactive
Communication
Having discussed the case for two parties in the previous chapter, we now design a
simulator for a multiparty interactive communication protocol. In this problem, n
players are in a network connected by point-to-point binary symmetric channels, and
we want to simulate a distributed protocol P, even when an adversary can flip bits
on any of the channels at any time. Our goal is to create a new protocol P 0 that
correctly simulates P even in the presence of such adversarial bit flipping.
Under certain special conditions on P, it is already known how to create a P 0 with
a multiplicative blowup in the number of bits sent that is O(log n) [98], or even O(1)
for certain network topologies [11, 65, 63]. However, the conditions on P are strong:
it must be a protocol that sends exactly 1 bit over every channel in every time step.
Unfortunately, in a complete network, where the average number of messages sent per
round in P is only Õ(n), the multiplicative blowup can become Ω̃(n). This is much
too high for practitioners who need noise-tolerant distributed algorithms.
In this chapter, we take a first step toward designing an algorithm with costs that
scale well for any network topology. In particular, if an adversary flips T bits, then our
algorithm sends Õ(L + T ) bits, where L is the number of bits sent in P. Importantly,
our algorithm requires no a priori knowledge of T or L.
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To obtain this result, we make an important assumption that P is asynchronous:
it runs correctly even with arbitrary message delays. There exist many examples
of asynchronous algorithms known for common problems that need to be solved in
noisy networks including: leader election [35], minimum spanning tree [19], shortest
paths [17], maximal independent set [12], stochastic gradient descent [109], and dominating set [110]. Our result allows using any asynchronous algorithm to design a new
synchronous algorithm that is robust to channel noise. This new algorithm sends significantly fewer bits compared to prior work, which sends Ω(nL) bits [98, 11, 30, 63].
Additionally, when T = Õ(L), the new algorithm sends only Õ(L) bits.

3.1

Model Details

We now describe some details of our model. We refer the reader to [81, 107] for more
details on synchrony and asynchrony in distributed computing.
Asynchrony of P. Different from past work, we require that P runs correctly in an
asynchronous network. Recall that an asynchronous network allows for adversarial
delay of messages.
Synchrony of P 0 . Following past work, we require that P 0 is run in a synchronous
network. A synchronous network assumes that the amount of time needed to deliver
a message over any channel is fixed and known. We define a time step as the amount
of time that it takes to send one bit over a channel.
Binary Channels. In each time step, a bit value is set for every channel. This is the
value received by any player listening on the channel. In any contiguous sequence of
time steps where no player sends a bit, the adversary sets the bits, and pays a cost of
1 for each time it changes the value. For example, if there are 3 such contiguous time
steps, the adversary can set the bit values to “000” or “111” at cost 0, or to “010” at
cost 2. This cost model follows that in [34].
Additional Assumptions. As in prior work [98, 11], we assume that all players know
the value n. However, we do not assume players know the values L, T and α. We
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assume private channels, but otherwise make no cryptographic assumptions. Finally,
in the case where we want an error probability that is smaller than a polynomial in
n, we require that all players know a desired error probability δ.

3.2

Our Result

Our main result is summarized in the following theorem. The latency of protocol P 0
is the total number of time steps that elapse until all processors in P 0 terminate. A
communication path in an asynchronous simulation of P is a directed path over the
players such that (1) any edge (u, v) in the path represents a message sent from player
u to player v; and (2) for any two successive edges (u, v) and (v, w) in the path, the
message associated with edge (u, v) was received by v prior to v sending the message
associated with edge (v, w).
Theorem 1. Let P be an asynchronous protocol for n ≥ 2 players that sends a total
of L bits. Let α be the average message length in P. Let δ > 0. Then we can create a
synchronous protocol P 0 (via Algorithm 5 in Section 3.4) with the following properties.
1. For any number T of adversarial bit flips, , P 0 succeeds with probability at least
1 − δ. That is, each player stops after a finite number of time steps, and outputs
a valid transcript of its run of P.
2. The number of bits sent is O L 1 +

1
α

log

nL
δ




+T .

3. The total latency is




O max Λp
p



1
1 + log
α



n(L + T )
δ




+ Tp

where p ranges over all communication paths in the asynchronous simulation
of P, Λp is the latency of p, and Tp is the total number of bits flipped by the
adversary on channels in p.
We make several observations about this result. First, P 0 always sends Õ(L + T )
bits, where the Õ notation hides a logarithmic term in n, L and δ; if the desired δ
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is polynomially (or even sub-polynomially) small in n, then the Õ notation hides a
logarithmic (polylogarithmic) term just in n and L. Second, if α is Ω (log(nL/δ)), P 0
sends only O(L + T ) bits, and is thus within a constant factor of optimal. Finally,
P 0 requires no a priori knowledge of L, T , α, or the network topology.1 However, it
does require all nodes know n, and that they agree on some desired δ.

3.2.1

High-level Overview

At a high level, our approach is as follows. For every channel that connects two
players, each of these players runs two protocols for that channel, one for sending
messages (Algorithm 3) and one for receiving messages (Algorithm 4).2 Additionally, each player simulates P by running Algorithm 5. Algorithm 5 coordinates the
actions of the player based on messages received through all instances that player is
running of Algorithm 4. These actions may include sending messages via instances of
Algorithm 3.
A naive idea is to run the 2-player algorithm from Chapter 2 over each communication channel. Unfortunately, this fails. In particular, this protocol assumes that
a player sends a bit on the channel in each time step. However, in the multiparty
problem, there may be many time steps where, for many channels, neither player on
the channel sends a bit. This can happen because delay due to noise on one channel is holding up the protocol on all other channels, or simply because both players
connected by a channel are waiting for messages from other players before using that
channel.
We note that we do make use of two key ideas from [34]. First, we use Algebraic
Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes [33]. These codes enable detection of any bit
flips in a code word with probability of error that is exponentially small in the number
of bits added to the message word. Second, similarly to [34], we use error-correcting
encoding of AMD code words to ensure that when we have to resend a message, our
1

We note that all prior interactive communication results assumes a priori knowledge of L.
These protocols are run “in parallel” via multiplexing over the binary symmetric channel connecting the two players.
2
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costs are linear in the number of bits flipped by the adversary (see Section 3.4.1 for
details).

3.2.2

Technical Challenges

Below are the key techniques used in our algorithm.
Accepting Messages. Notifying others of errors when there are n > 2 players can
be costly since errors can propagate through the network quickly. Thus, in contrast
to [34], upon accepting a message, our protocol commits irrevocably to it.
This gives rise to two problems. First, we need to keep the total error probability
small even when we do not know in advance the number of bits that will be sent in
P. To solve this, we carefully decrease error probabilities for each message sent over
time, by slowly increasing codeword lengths. We do this in such a way that our total
error probability is bounded by a sufficiently small geometric sum.
Second, suppose a player receives the message m twice in a row from the same
sender. We now must distinguish between two cases: (1) m is sent twice in a row in
P; and (2) the acknowledgement sent by the receiver of m was corrupted, and so the
sender sent m again. We address this problem via a parity bit, similar to [38], which
we use in our message send and receive protocols. See Section 3.4.2 for details.
Cost-Efficient Key Exchange. For n > 2 players, for any channel, there can be many
time steps where neither player is sending on that channel. The adversary can try
to forge messages during these time steps. To prevent this, we use a key-exchange
protocol.
Naive key exchanges for our problem fail to be cost-efficient. For example, if only
the sender sends a key, then during time steps when the sender is not sending, the
adversary can forge messages from the sender. Thus, both the sender and the receiver
must exchange keys.
Additionally, if the sender does not first send a message to initiate the key exchange, then the receiver does not know when to start receiving a message in P.
Then the receiver may unnecessarily send key-exchange messages on the channel even
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though the sender is not using the channel. Thus, our key exchange protocol has keys
for sender and receiver, and also includes a key request phase.
Finally, some care must be taken to design the protocol so that (1) it works
correctly when the sender is sending and the receiver is listening; and (2) when only
the receiver is active, it learns this quickly, so that the number of bits sent by the
players grows slowly with the number of bits flipped by the adversary. See Section 3.4
and Figure 3.1 for details.
Adjusting for Average Message Lengths. Finally, as an additional result, we show how
to reduce resource costs when the average message length is high, even if it is not
known in advance. We do this by dividing long messages into smaller chunks, which
are sent in order. However, since we increase the codeword lengths over time, this
gives rise to the following problem. If a chunk x of message m needs resending due
to adversarial bit flips, then the resend in the following round will not only include
the bits in x, but also some extra bits from m to make up for the increased codeword
length. This introduces two challenges: (1) the sender of the message must decide how
the message should be divided into chunks prior to sending it; and (2) the receiver of
the message must eventually piece the chunks back together into the correct message.
On the sender side, we handle this by extracting the next chunk only when the
current chunk has been correctly received, and no further resends are attempted. On
the receiver side, we replace the local copy of the chunk received in round r with its
resend received in round r +1 to account for the extra bits that the latter will contain.
Additionally, the receiver must disambiguate a chunk resend from a repeated chunk
using a parity bit.

3.3

Related Work

In this section, we survey related work on Interactive Communication and Rateless
Codes. There has been significant interest in Interactive communication over the last
several years, so for conciseness, we discuss only the most relevant work, with a focus
31

on algorithms that are robust to adversarial noise. For a detailed survey of the field,
we refer the reader to the excellent survey by Ran Gelles [51].

3.3.1

Interactive Communication (n = 2)

The problem of interactive communication was first posed by Schulman [104, 103],
who describes a deterministic method for simulating interactive protocols on noisy
channels with only a constant-factor increase in the total communication complexity.
This initial work spurred vigorous interest in the area (see [24, 51] for some excellent
surveys).
Schulman’s scheme tolerates an adversarial noise rate of 1/240, even when channels
are public and the adversary knows all information. It critically depends on the notion
of a tree code for which an exponential-time construction was originally provided. This
exponential construction time motivated work on more efficient constructions [25, 94,
87]. There were also efforts to create alternative codes [52, 92]. Recently, elegant
computationally-efficient schemes that tolerate a constant adversarial noise rate have
been demonstrated [22, 54]. Additionally, a large number of results have improved the
tolerable adversarial noise rate [23, 28, 55, 47, 26], as well as tuning the communication
costs to a known, but not necessarily constant, adversarial noise rate [58].

3.3.2

Interactive Communication (n > 2)

Arbitrary Topologies. As noted previously, Rajagopalan and Schulman [98] have
shown how to obtain a O(log n) blowup in the number of bits sent when P is an
algorithm that sends exactly 1 bit over every channel in every time step. Their result
holds when the fraction of bits corrupted by an adversary on any channel is constant,
and even when all channels are public. Recently, Braverman et al [27] show this
blowup is essentially tight in this model, by giving a lower bound for any interactive
communication protocol running on a star network. In particular, they show that a


log n
blowup of Ω log log n is necessary when the fraction of corrupted bits is constant,
even when the noise is stochastic.
32

Recent work by Censor-Hillel, Gelles and Haeupler [30] shows how to make any
asynchronous distributed protocol robust against adversarial noise. The multiplicative
bandwidth blowup for their protocols is O(n log2 n). Critically, their robust protocol
is asynchronous in contrast to our robust protocol which is synchronous. We can
use the techniques in [30] to make our robust protocol asynchronous at the cost of a
multiplicative bandwidth blowup of O(n log2 n).
We note that all of the above protocols tolerate up to a Θ(1/n) fraction of message
corruptions. This is optimal since, with public channels, if more than a 1/n fraction
of messages are corrupted, the adversary can simply cut off all communication to
a particular player. We discuss how we can tolerate a higher amount of noise with
private channels in Section 3.3.3.
Special Topologies. Alon et al. [11] present an algorithm that achieves a constant bit
blowup for the special case of a complete network, or any network with constant mixing time. Hoza and Schulman [63] describe an algorithm that has constant bandwidth
blowup for networks with O(n) edges. However, their algorithm can have multiplicative bandwidth blowup of θ(n log n) when the number of edges in the network is θ(n2 ).
We note that the algorithm of Jain, Kalai and Lewko [65] consider networks where
one node is connected to every other node. They describe an algorithm with constant
multiplicative bandwidth blowup for these networks. Finally, Gelles and Kalai [53]
show that in a ring topology, logarithmic bandwidth blowup is necessary and sufficient
(for asynchronous protocols).
We note that these previous results achieve an error probability that is exponentially small in the latency of P.

3.3.3

How is our Model Different?

Most prior results for interactive communication give the coding rate, which is the
blowup in the number of bits sent, as a function of the error-rate, which is the fraction
of bits flipped. To better compare our result with past work, we make a similar
calculation in Section 3.9.
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Our work is not directly comparable to most past results because we do not quantify our results in terms of the fraction of messages that are corrupted, and more
importantly, we assume that communication takes place over private channels.
The stronger assumption of private channels means that up to a 1/ log(nL) fraction
of message bits can be corrupted, and our algorithm is still likely to succeed with a
cost overhead that is only O(log(nL)).
In our setting, the adversarial strategy of trying to cut off all communications to
and from a single player requires corruption of much more than a 1/n fraction of bits.
This is true since our protocol can detect the noise, and then increase the fraction of
the total communication involving the beleaguered player.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, all prior work on Interactive Communications
assumes players know L in advance. We are able to remove this assumption of a priori
knowledge of L.

3.3.4

Interactive Communication with Private Channels.

Our result builds on a result for 2-player interactive communication over a private
channel by Dani et al [34]. Like our result, their work tolerates an unknown but finite
number of adversarial bit flips, T . They show that private channels are necessary in
order to tolerate unknown T . Their algorithm assumes that both players know L.

p
L(T + 1) log L + T bits in expectation. We note
Their algorithm sends L + O
that for n = 2 players, our protocol sends O (L log(L/δ) + T ) bits, which is larger for
any choice of δ.

3.4

Our Algorithm

We discuss the overall idea and technical aspects of our main algorithm in this section. The detailed steps are presented in Algorithm 5 in Section 3.4.4, which uses
Algorithms 3 and 4 as subroutines. We also provide a flowchart (see Figure 3.1) to
illustrate the different steps for communication over a single channel in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart for Alice and Bob during each round of our multi party IC
protocol. Here w denotes the word length in the current round.
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For now, we assume that P consists of one-bit messages. We remove this assumption to handle arbitrary message lengths later in the chapter.

3.4.1

Notation and Definitions

Some helper functions and notation used in our algorithm as follows. For a string s,
we use the notation s[i] to denote the ith bit of s and s[i, j] to denote the substring
(s[i], s[i + 1], . . . , s[j − 1]). We let |s| denote the length of string s, and use the
conventions that s = (s[0], s[1], . . . , s[|s| − 1]), and for j > |s|, s[i, j] = s[i, |s|]. We
use ⊕ to denote the XOR operation on bit strings. We assume that all logarithms
used in this chapter are of base two.
Our algorithm makes use of Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes and
Error-Correcting Codes, similar to Chapter 2. Our use of notations for these codes is
consistent with those in Chapter 2.
Silence. We define the function IsSilence (s) to return true iff the string s has fewer
than |s|/3 bit alternations. We also define S` = {s ∈ {0, 1}` | IsSilence (s)}. We
drop the subscript when ` is clear from the context.

3.4.2

Algorithm Overview

Our algorithm proceeds in rounds, each of which consists of the following steps. For
convenience, our presentation assumes two bidirectional channels between each pair
of (neighboring) players, one for each player to initiate a round with the other. We
can simulate these two channels by multiplexing over a single channel, at the cost of
a factor 2 increase in the number of time steps.
1. If u has a message for v, it initiates a message exchange by asking v for a key.
We use the keyword KEY? to denote this request for the key.
2. Upon receipt of this key, u sends the message along with the key.
3. v terminates the message exchange upon successful authentication and retrieval
of the message.
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4. u terminates the message exchange upon hearing silence from v.
This goes on until all the messages in P have been communicated to the intended
recipients.
Rounds. For each message m in P that needs to be sent from some player u to
his neighbor v, we communicate m through a sequence of exchanges between players
u, referred to as Alice, and v, referred to as Bob, in P 0 using Algorithms 3 and 4,
respectively. As mentioned above, the sequence of time steps corresponding to steps
1-4 of the algorithm overview constitute what we call a round. Thus, each round
of P consists of exactly four words, one for each of the steps 1-4. The length of
each word in round r is denoted wr . This depends on the round number r and is
therefore a function of the current time step, which can be computed independently
by each player using the global clock. We make wr gradually increase with r (the
exact dependence will be provided shortly).
Since each message in P is just a single bit, it takes exactly one round to be
communicated in P 0 , if no successful corruption happens, and more otherwise. If a
round for some message m is corrupted, we attempt resending m in the subsequent
round, which provides higher security due to a larger word length.
At the beginning of each round, Bob must listen for a key request during the first
wr time steps. If no valid request is received, he idles until the start of the next round.
Thus Bob is active in every round. For her part, Alice only participates in a round if,
in P, she has a message to send to Bob.
Parity Bit. Observe that it is possible that Alice and Bob have different views on
whether a particular round was successful. More concretely, if Bob encounters two
progressive rounds that contain the same message, with no silent round in between,
he needs to distinguish between whether Alice is resending the message or whether
Alice’s next message happens to be the same as the previous one. To disambiguate
these cases, Alice appends a bit b to each message m that she sends to Bob, where b
is the parity of the index of m. We will refer to b as the parity bit for m and use the
notation (m, b) to denote this augmented message.
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Word Generation. Both Alice and Bob generate their words for round r using a
function Er (x, k), described below, which returns the encoding of the word’s content
x using the key k based on the security settings for round r. Here x may be the
message m from P, a special keyword KEY? used by Alice to request Bob’s key, or
m
l
√
bits.
Bob’s key for the round. The key k, for round r, is a string of length 2 log 4nπr
δ
This key length, and other corresponding encoding parameters, are chosen to ensure
the failure events for our algorithm occur within the given error tolerance, δ.
In Alice’s first call to E , k is a random string. In Bob’s call, k is the key he received
from Alice in the previous word, but x is a random string of the appropriate length.
In Alice’s second call, k is the key she received from Bob in the previous word. Alice
and Bob generate fresh random keys for each round in which they desire to send a
message.
The function Er (x, k) is formally defined as follows. The function first appends
m
l
√
bits. Then, it encodes this
the content x with a key k of length κr = 2 log 4nπr
δ
δ
.
2n2 π 2 r2

Then, it encodes
l
m
√
this AMD codeword with a (1/3)-error-correcting code. Finally, it pads 38 log 2nπr
δ

concatenated string of bits with an AMD code using ηr =

random bits to the ECC codeword. These random bits are added to ensure that
players are unlikely to confuse words with silence and that the adversary is unlikely
to flip bits of a word to forge silence. As a result, the word length for round r is given

as wr = O log nr
.
δ
Similar to Er (x, k), we define a function Dr (m) which returns either a pair (x0 , k 0 )
such that Er (x0 , k 0 ) = m or returns (⊥, ⊥), if no such (x0 , k 0 ) exists. It begins by
stripping off the padding at the end of m to obtain a shorter string m0 . Then it
decodes the error correction, computing m00 = ecDec (m0 ). If IsCodeword (m00 , ηr ),
then D outputs amdDec (m00 , η), otherwise it returns (⊥, ⊥).
Failure Events There are certain events which may cause our algorithm to fail.
More specifically, it is possible that the adversary (1) converts one AMD codeword
to another, so that the decoded content is different from the content intended; (2)
38

converts a non-silence word into silence; and (3) correctly guesses some player’s key
and uses it to communicate bits that are not in P. We will discuss these failure events
in detail and analyze their probabilities of occurrence in Section 3.5.1.

Algorithm 3 Message exchange algorithm for the sender. Send-Message is only
called at the beginning of a round.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

procedure SEND-MSG(m)
. b is a persistent variable for the parity bit. On the first call to SEND-MSG,
b is set to 0. On subsequent calls it is whatever it was set to on the previous call.
while true do
Generate random key kA of length κr . r is the current round number..
Send Er (KEY?, kA ).
M1 ← wr bits from the receiver.
if IsSilence (M1 ) then . assume the receiver has already terminated.
Stay silent for 2wr time steps and return
else
(x, k) ← Dr (M1 )
if k 6= kA then
Stay silent for 2wr time steps.
else
kB ← x
Send Er ((m, b), kB ).
M2 ← wr bits from the receiver.
if IsSilence (M2 ) then
b ← ¬b and return

3.4.3

Round Details

We will now describe various scenarios for what may happen in a round during the
execution of the algorithm, for a particular bidirectional channel. There are O(n2 )
such channels, and the same round may have different scenarios enacted on it on
different channels. Moreover, the views of Alice and Bob may differ on which scenario
was enacted. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that none of the failure events as
described above happen for the remainder of this section.

Silent Rounds These are rounds in which Bob hears silence when he listens to
the first word of the round on the channel. Since the adversary cannot tamper with
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Algorithm 4 Message exchange algorithm for the receiver. Receive-Message is only
called at the beginning of a round.
1:
2:

3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

procedure RECEIVE-MSG( )
. b̂ is a persistent variable for the parity bit. On the first call to
RECEIVE-MSG, b̂ is set to 0. On subsequent calls it is whatever it was set
to on the previous call.
M10 ← wr bits from the sender.
if IsSilence (M10 ) then
Stay silent for 3wr time steps.
. r is the current round number.
else
(x0 , k 0 ) ← Dr (M10 )
if x0 6= KEY? then
Send noise for wr time steps.
Stay silent for 2wr time steps.
else
kA ← k 0 .
Generate random key kB of length κr .
Send Er (kB , kA ).
M20 ← wr bits from the sender.
(x00 , k 00 ) ← Dr (M20 )
if k 00 6= kB then
Send noise for wr time steps.
else
(m0 , b0 ) ← x00
if b0 6= b̂ different from last message then
Set b̂ ← b0 and record the message m0 from the sender.
Stay silent for wr time steps.
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messages from Alice to look like silence, such a round can happen only when Alice
had no message for Bob. Thus, nothing further happens in the round and both Alice
and Bob stay silent. This way, both views agree that the round was silent.

Progressive Rounds These are rounds in which the number of bits flipped by the
adversary is small enough that it is handled by the error-correction codes, so that
encoded messages are successfully recovered upon receipt. Furthermore, when Bob
is silent (after successful authentication of the message from Alice), the adversary is
unable to set sufficiently many bits on the channel from Bob to make Alice believe
otherwise. This allows Alice to decide that Bob has successfully received her message.
Hence, when the round ends, both Alice and Bob agree that the round was successful.

Corrupted Rounds These are rounds in which the adversary is able to successfully
corrupt one or more of the words in the round. The following cases are possible.
Case I. Alice is silent, but the adversary sends Bob a key request. Following this,
Bob samples a key and sends it to Alice. But she is not expecting a message from
Bob and hence, remains silent. At this point the adversary can say whatever he wants
on the channel. However, since he does not know Bob’s key3 , he cannot authenticate
his message. Thus, Bob receives an invalid communication and responds with noise.
Again, since Alice is not expecting any message from Bob at this point, she remains
silent and does nothing. Thus, such a round is corrupted in Bob’s view, but silent in
Alice’s.4
Case II.. The adversary corrupts Alice’s key request. Bob, upon receipt of this
invalid key request, remains silent in the rest of the round. The adversary may now say
whatever he wants on the channel from Bob. In particular, he may try to impersonate
Bob and send Alice a key. However, since he cannot reproduce Alice’s key from the
request that she originally sent to Bob, the adversary is unable to authenticate himself
3

Recall our assumption about private channels and the fact that the adversary is oblivious to the
private random bits of the players.
4
Note that Bob may realize that the round was silent in Alice’s view at a later stage, but we still
account for this as a corrupted round, since Bob has already incurred a cost for the corruption.
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as Bob. Thus, Alice receives an invalid communication, and stays silent until the end
of the round.
Case III. Bob receives Alice’s key request, but the adversary corrupts Bob’s
reply, which contains his key. However, since the adversary cannot corrupt one AMD
codeword into another, Alice is unable to decode the message into a key for Bob,
causing her to remain silent for the remainder of the round. Again, the adversary
cannot forge a message from Alice since he cannot reproduce Bob’s key.
Case IV. The adversary is inactive for the first half of the round until Alice
receives Bob’s key. After that, the adversary corrupts Alice’ communication of her
message to Bob. This will disable Bob to decode the message at his end and consequently, he injects noise into the channel. Since the adversary cannot convert this
noise into silence, Alice knows that the round has failed, and of course, so does Bob.
Case V. The round succeeds all the way to the point where Bob decides that
the round is successful and remains silent. The adversary then injects noise onto the
channel causing Alice to think the round has failed. Thus, such a round is corrupted
in Alice’s view but progressive in Bob’s. However, this is not a problem because when
Alice resends the message in the following round, she keeps the parity bit unchanged
to indicate to Bob that this is a resend (and not a fresh message). Hence, Bob will
receive the message again in this round. At this stage, of course, Bob realizes that
the previous round was in fact, corrupted, and disregards the message he believed
was successfully received in the previous round. There is no other difference in Bob’s
future actions.

3.4.4

The protocol P 0

We now present our main protocol P 0 , described by Algorithm 5.
As shown in [81] Chapter 14.1.1, any asynchronous distributed algorithm can be
represented as an I/O automaton with certain properties. We make use of this definition to represent P. This formulation will be helpful in proving the required security
properties of our protocol.
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We assume that for each player u in the network, P provides an I/O automaton
Pu with the following properties.

5

• Pu has a single initial state.
• Pu has some subset of states that are termination states. Each termination
state may have a value for u to output.
• There is a set of transition relations, each from one state to another state,
each labeled with an action, where this action may be either an input action
(e.g. receiving a message) or an output action (e.g. sending a message). These
transitions satisfy the property for every state s, for every possible input action,
a, there is a transition from s to some other state that is labelled with a.

3.5

Analysis of Algorithm 3

We now analyze the failure probability and total number of bits sent in P 0 . We begin
by computing the failure probability for the algorithm, by considering the three bad
events as before, and then take a union bound over all the rounds. We will then prove
that the algorithm is correct and terminates in finitely many time steps. Finally, we
compute an upper bound on the expected number of bits the algorithm sends.

3.5.1

Probability of Failure

We define three bad events for a round.
1. AMD Failure : The adversary is able to flip the bits to convert the message into
another valid word. In this case, the affected players end their rounds either
with authentication failures or with knowledge of bits which are not in P.
5
We use an I/O automaton to capture subtleties of simulating an asynchronous protocol. For
example, when player x sends a message to player y, we must show that either player y eventually
receives this message, or that player y terminates in P before receipt of the message.
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Algorithm 5 Protocol P 0 , run at each node u
1: s ← initial state of Pu
2: while s is not a termination state do
3:
if there is a transition relation from state s to state s0 in Pu labeled with an
output action to send message m to neighbor v then
4:
Schedule SEND-MSG(m) to run on the channel to v.
If no call to SEND-MSG is currently running on the channel, begin immediately.
Otherwise, set up the call to begin as soon as all currently scheduled
SEND-MSG
calls on this channel have finished running.
5:
Transition to state s0 in Pu ; s ← s0 .
6:
else
7:
repeat
8:
for each neighbor v, in parallel run RECEIVE-MSG() on the channel
from v.
9:
until the RECEIVE-MSG calls have recorded some non-empty set S of
messages
10:
for each message m in S do
11:
Let s0 be the target state on the transition relation from s with input
action m.
12:
Transition to state s0 in Pu ; s ← s0 .
13: Set player u’s output based on the termination state.
14: Continue executing any remaining scheduled SEND-MSG calls until all have returned.
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2. Conversion to Silence : The adversary is able to flip bits in such a way that
some player’s random bits look like silence to his neighbor, resulting in the
latter ending his round without the knowledge of this failure.
3. Key Installation : The adversary installs a correct key from Bob when Alice is
silent (to successfully simulate line 15 of Algorithm 3) or installs a correct key
from Alice when Bob is silent (to successfully simulate line 14 of Algorithm 4).
We bound the probabilities of each of these failure events by δ/3 in Lemmas 10, 12
and 13, respectively. Finally, we use a union bound in Lemma 14 to eventually prove
that our algorithm succeeds with probability at least 1 − δ.
Lemma 10. In P 0 , AMD Failure occurs with probability at most δ/3.
Proof. Recall that in any round, four words are exchanged between any pair of players,

and that at most n2 < n2 pairs of players may be exchanging words with each
other. Furthermore, in a given round r, the AMD failure probability for a single
word is set to be at most ηr = (nπr)−2 δ/2, as discussed in Section 3.4.2. Now, for
1 ≤ k ≤ 4, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and r ≥ 1, define ξi,j,k,r to be the event that in round
r, AMD failure occurs in the k th word exchanged between players i and j. Then,

S
ξ
≤
Pr(ξi,j,k,r ) ≤ (nπr)−2 δ/2. Hence, by a union bound, we get Pr
i,j,k,r i,j,k,r
P
P4 Pn P
1
2δ
δ
δ
i,j=1
r≥1 r2 = 3 .
k=1
r≥1 2(nπr)2 ≤ π 2
i6=j

Lemma 11. For b ≥ 95, the probability that a b-bit string sampled uniformly at
random from {0, 1}b has fewer than b/3 bit alternations is at most e−b/19 .
Proof. Let s be a string sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}b , where b ≥ 95.
Denote by s[i] the ith bit of s. Let Xi be the indicator random variable for the event
that s[i] 6= s[i + 1], for 1 ≤ i < b. Note that all Xi ’s are mutually independent.
P
Let X be the number of bit alternations in s. Clearly, X = b−1
i=1 Xi , which gives
P
E(X) = b−1
i=1 E(Xi ), using the linearity of expectation. Since E(Xi ) = 1/2 for all
1 ≤ i < b, we get E(X) = (b − 1)/2. Using a multiplicative version of Chernoff’s
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bound (see [36]), we have that for 0 ≤ t ≤

√

b − 1,

√


b−1 t b−1
2
Pr X <
−
≤ e−t /2 .
2
2
To obtain Pr(X < b/3), we set t =

b−3
√
3 b−1

to get

(b−3)2

Pr(X < b/3) ≤ e− 18(b−1) ≤ e−b/19

for b ≥ 95,

where the condition b ≥ 95 comes from rounding the solution to a quadratic equation.

Lemma 12. In P 0 , Conversion to Silence occurs with probability at most δ/3.
l 
m
√
Proof. Recall that in round r, each encoded message includes 38 log 2nπr
random
δ
bits at the end. Then, Lemma 11 tells us that the probability that adversary
 is


38 log

able to flip these random bits of a word to forge silence is at most 2−

2nπr
√
δ

19

≤

(nπr)−2 δ/4. Thus, similar to Lemma 10, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 4, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and r ≥ 1,
define ξi,j,k,r to be the event that in round r, the k th word exchanged between players
i and j is converted to silence, so that Pr(ξi,j,k,r ) ≤ (nπr)−2 δ/4. Hence, by using a
similar union bound as Lemma 10, we get the desired bound.
Lemma 13. In P 0 , the adversary is able to guess the key of some player with probability at most δ/3.
m
l 
4nπr
√
Proof. Recall that the keys are of length 2 log
in round r. Each such key is
δ
generated uniformly at random from the set of all binary strings of this length. Thus,
l 
m
√
−2 log 4nπr

the probability of guessing this key is at most 2

δ

≤ (nπr)−2 δ/16. Again,

similar to Lemma 10, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 4, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and r ≥ 1, define ξi,j,k,r to be the
event that in round r, the adversary is able to guess the key in the k th word exchanged
between players i and j, so that Pr(ξi,j,k,r ) ≤ (nπr)−2 δ/16. Hence, by using a similar
union bound as Lemma 10, we get the desired bound.
Lemma 14. With probability at least 1 − δ, none of the failure events happen during
a run of P 0 .
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Proof. A run of protocol P 0 fails if any of the three failure events described above
happen. From Lemmas 10, 12 and 13, the total probability of failure is computed
by using union bound over the three failure events, which gives δ/3 + δ/3 + δ/3 = δ.
Hence, the run succeeds with probability at least 1 − δ.
Next, now show that P 0 correctly simulates all valid runs of P.

3.5.2

Correctness

All lemmas in this section assume that none of the failure events occur. Without loss
of generality, we also assume that Alice and Bob generate their keys in every round.
We use the phrase terminated in P to mean finished executing line 13 of Algorithm 5.
Lemma 15. Fix a round r of P 0 . Let W be any of the four sequences of wr bits on
the channel from Alice to Bob or the channel from Bob to Alice in this round and
(r)

(r)

kA , kB be the keys that Alice and Bob generate in this round. Then exactly one of
the following hold.
1. IsSilence (W ) is true, in which case the sender on the channel was silent as
well.
2. Dr (W ) = C 6=⊥. Then,
(r)

(a) If C = (KEY?, k), then either Alice sent W with key k = kA , or Alice is
silent and the adversary sent W .
(r)

(b) If C = (k 0 , kA ), then Bob has not terminated in P yet, and he sent W
(r)

with key k 0 = kB .
(r)

(c) If C = (x, kB ), then Alice sent W with content x = m(r) , where m(r) is
Alice’s message for Bob in round r.
(d) Otherwise, the adversary sent W on a silent channel.
3. Bob executed line 18 of Algorithm 4.
4. W is the outcome of adversarial tampering on the channel.
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Proof. In any given round r, whenever Alice or Bob send a word to the other, this
word does not convert to silence because we assume that the failure event Conversion
to Silence does not occur. Hence, if silence is received on the channel, then the sender
on the channel must have been silent at that time. This proves part (1) of our lemma.
If, however, a valid AMD codeword is received, which decodes into C, the following
cases are possible. Case 2(a) : If C = (KEY?, k), then either Alice issued this key
(r)

request to Bob with her key kA (line 5 of Algorithm 3), or she was silent. In the
(r)

former case, the adversary is unable to put a key k 6= kA in the codeword since
(r)

the failure event AMD Failure does not occur, and hence, k = kA . In the latter
case, since the channel is silent, the adversary must have issued the key request with
(r)

some key k. Case 2(b) : If C = (k 0 , kA ), then since we assume that the failure event
Key Installation does not occur, it must be the case that Bob sent W and not the
(r)

adversary. Thus, Bob must have included his own key kB to the codeword along with
a copy of Alice’s key (line 14 of Algoithm 4). This is only possible when Bob has not
(r)

terminated in P yet. Case 2(c) : If C = (x, kB ), then Alice must have sent W since
the the failure event Key Installation does not occur. Also, since we assume that the
failure event AMD Failure does not occur, the adversary would have not been able
to convert m(r) into another message successfully, and hence, W must contain the
message that Alice has for Bob in this round. Case 2(d) : If the AMD codeword is
neither of the above three cases, then it must be the case that the sender was on the
channel at the time W was on the channel, since AMD Failure does not occur. Hence,
the adversary must have sent W on a silent channel.
If neither silence nor an AMD codeword is received, then W is noise. The only
step in P 0 where noise is intentionally put on the channel is when Bob has to inform
Alice that he did not receive her message correctly (line 18 of Algorithm 4). Thus,
if Bob sent this noise, Case 3 of our lemma holds, else Case 4 must hold where the
adversary has tampered with the bits on the channel so that W becomes noise.
Lemma 16. Assume Alice calls SEND-MSG(m) in some round r1 for some message
m and bit b. Then the following hold: (1) Alice returns from SEND-MSG(m) in some
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round r3 ≥ r1 ; and (2) either Bob records the message m (line 22 of Algorithm 2)
in exactly one round r2 where r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 , or Bob does not record the message m
between rounds r1 and r3 because Bob terminated in P.
Proof. We first show that if Alice calls SEND-MSG(m) in round r1 , then there must
exist some round r3 ≥ r1 in which this call returns. Since the adversary’s budget is
finite, there must be some round, r4 , after which no bits are ever flipped. If the call
returns before round r4 , then part (1) is proven, so we only consider the cases where
the call extends past round r4 . In round r4 + 1, after Alice has sent a key request she
either hears silence, indicating that Bob has terminated in P, and the call returns, or
she correctly receives Bob’s key, and uses it to send m which Bob correctly receives,
and records (since the bit b is different than the bit in the last message recorded).
Next, Alice hears silence from Bob. This ends the call. Either way the call returns
at the end of round r4 + 1. Thus, in every case there is some round r3 ≥ r1 in which
the call to SEND-MSG(m) returns.
We now prove part (2) of our lemma. We first show that the message m is recorded
at most once by Bob in the rounds r1 to r3 . By Lemma 15 (2(c)), the bit b0 received
by Bob in line 20 of Algorithm 2 must be the same as the bit b sent by Alice from
rounds r1 to r3 . Since this bit never changes, Bob will record a message at most once
in rounds r1 to r3 .
If Bob terminated in P before round r3 , then part (2) of our lemma statement does
not require Bob to record the message m, and so that part or our lemma is trivially
true. Thus, for the remainder of the proof, we assume that Bob has not terminated
in P before round r3 .
Consider round r3 in which the call to SEND-MSG(m) returns. Let M1 be the
string read by Alice on line 6 of Algorithm 3. Since Bob has not terminated, Lemma 15
(2(b)) guarantees that Bob sent M1 , and therefore the call to Algorithm 4 does not
return on line 8. Hence, it returns on line 18. Since this is the last round, M1 must
correctly decode to (kB , kA ) in Algorithm 3. Thus, Alice sends Bob m using kB and
hears silence subsequently. Thus, Bob must have actually been silent at this time
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(Lemma 15 (1)), which only happens if he has either now or previously recorded m.
Hence, Bob must have recorded the message m in some round r2 ≤ r3 .
Lemma 17. The following holds for P 0 . For any message m that Bob records (line 22
of Algorithm 4) in some round r2 , Alice started a call to SEND-MSG with the message
m, in a round r1 ≤ r2 and returned from that call in some round r3 ≥ r2 .
Proof. Consider the round r2 in which the Bob records a message m (line 22 of
Algorithm 2). In round r2 , in line 20 of Algorithm 4, let Dr (M10 ) = ((m, b), kB ). Thus,
by Lemma 15 (2(c)), Alice must have sent Er ((m, b), kB ), during the transmission of
M10 . Hence, Alice must be in a call to SEND-MSG with the message m, and this call
must have begun in some round r1 ≤ r2 .
Finally, we know by Lemma 16(1) that every call to SEND-MSG ends in some
round r3 . Since, by the above, Alice is in the call during round r2 , it must be the case
that Alice returns from the call in some round r3 ≥ r2 .
Lemma 18. Algorithm P 0 terminates with a correct simulation of an asynchronous
run of P.
Proof. We show that for every pair of players u and v, protocol P 0 correctly simulates
a FIFO message channel(see [81] Chapter 14.1.2) from u to v during the simulation of
P. Then a direct induction shows that for each player u, Pu0 simulates Pu correctly.
Fix an arbitrary channel from u to v in the network. Let Qu,v be the queue of
SEND-MSG procedures that are maintained in P 0 by u of messages to send to v.
We require the following facts:
1. In any time step, there is a transition in Pu across a transition relation with
an output action to send a message m to player v, if and only if the procedure
SEND-MSG for message m to player v is pushed on the queue Qu,v in that time
step.
2. Every SEND-MSG procedure for message m on Qu,v will eventually start at
some round r1 and end in some round r3 . Moreover, player v transitions across
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an input transition relation for message m from player u at most once in some
round r2 , r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 . Moreover, if there is no such input transition relation,
than Pu has entered a termination state before round r3 .
3. For any transition along a transition relation in Pv with an input action, in
some round r2 , player u started a call to SEND-MSG with the message m, in a
round r1 ≤ r2 and returned from that call in some round r3 ≥ r2 .
Fact (1) follows directly from Algorithm 5 steps 3-6. The first sentence of Fact (2)
follows by induction and Lemma 16, and the remainder of the fact follows directly
from Lemma 16. Fact (3) follows from Lemma 17.
Together, the facts show that no matter what the actions of the adversary, the
protocol P 0 correctly simulates a FIFO message channel from player u to player v.
In particular, we have: 1) when a transition is taken in Pu with output action to
send message m to player v, this message is put on a queue; 2) all transitions in Pv
with an input action to receive a message m from player u are associated with the
removal of message m from the queue; and 3) all messages are eventually removed
from the queue, triggering transitions across transition relations with input actions in
Pv , unless Pv is already in a termination state.

3.6

Proof of Resource Costs

We now compute the expected number of bits sent and the latency of P 0 .
Lemma 19. In P 0 , round r ≥ 1 begins at time step τ (r) = Θ r log

nr
δ



.

Proof. For all r ≥ 1, note that round r + 1 begins as soon as the number of time steps
corresponding to four words of the round r have passed. Hence, we can compute
τ (r) using the recurrence τ (r) = τ (r − 1) + 4wr−1 , where τ (1) = 1. This gives
P
τ (r) = τ (1)+4 r−1
i=1 wi . Now, since wr = O(log(nr/δ)) (as discussed in Section 3.4.2),



P
ni
using wi ≤ C1 log ni
+ C2 , we get τ (r) ≤ 1 + 4 r−1
i=1 C1 log δ + C2 . Finally,
δ

P
using the fact that ri=1 log i = Θ(r log r), we get τ (r) = Θ r log nr
.
δ
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Lemma 20. If τ (x) ≤ z for some x ≥ 1 and z ≥ 1, then x = O(z/ log

nz
δ


).

Proof. We prove the bound on x for the case that τ (x) = z. By Lemma 19, we know


, for some constant C. Thus, we have z = Cx log nx
, and
that τ (x) = C x log nx
δ
δ

we get (*) x ≤ z/(C log nx
).
δ

≤ Cx log x. Taking logs of both sides, we get that
Note that z = Cx log nx
δ


nx
0
log z ≤ C 0 log x for some constant C 0 , which implies that log nz
≤
C
log
. Now
δ
δ

plugging this back into (*), we get that x ≤ C 00 z/ log nz
for some constant C 00 .
δ
Lemma 21. If P 0 succeeds, then it has the following resource costs.


• The number of bits sent is O L log nL
+
T
.
δ

n


o
n(L+T )
• The latency is O max Λp log
+ Tp , where the maximum is taken
δ
p

over all communication paths, p, in the asynchronous simulation of P, Λp is the
latency of p, and Tp is the total number of bits flipped by the adversary on edges
in p.
Proof. To bound the number of bits sent, we assume pessimistically that in every
round of P 0 , there is an attempt to send exactly one message. This maximizes the
number of bits sent since word sizes increase with time.
Since each word in P 0 is ECC encoded, the adversary must flip a constant fraction
of the bits to successfully corrupt the word, and thereby compromise the round. Let
x be the number of rounds in which some word was successfully corrupted by the
adversary. Since the length of the words increases with successive rounds, T must at
least be a constant, C, times the number of bits in the first x rounds of P 0 , and hence,
we must have τ (x) ≤ (T + 1)/C.




. Thus, since P 0 requires L


progressive rounds, the total number of rounds is r = L + O log(n(TT+1)/δ) .
By Lemma 20, we know that x = O

T
log(n(T +1)/δ)

Hence the total number of bits sent is at most τ (r). By Lemma 19,
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τ (r) = O
L+


T
log (n(T + 1)/δ)
 
 !
n
T
log
L+
δ
log (n(T + 1)/δ)



n(L + T )
T
log
≤O
L+
log (n(T + 1)/δ)
δ




n(L + T )
= O L log
+T
δ

 

nL
= O L log
+T .
δ

The second line above follows from

T
log(n(T +1)/δ)

≤ T , and the third line from the

fact that if L = O(T ), then log(L + T ) = O(log T ). The final line above follows
from the fact that log(L + T ) = log(L) + log(1 + T /L) ≤ log(L) + T /L, and hence
L log(L + T ) ≤ L log(L) + T . This bounds the number of bits sent.
To bound the latency, we note that the argument above holds for any communication path p in the asynchronous simulation of P. For the p which achieves the
maximum, it follows by induction that all other required messages will have already
been received by the time they are needed, and so p determines the overall latency.
We are finally ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 with α = 1. By Lemma 14, no failure event happens with probability at least 1 − δ, and by Lemma 18, in such a situation, P 0 terminates with an
asynchronous simulation of P. Upon correct termination, the resource cost bounds
hold by Lemma 21.

3.7

Simulating Protocols with Messages of Arbitrary Length

We now show how to reduce resource costs when the average message length in P is
high, even if this average is unknown a priori. For this section, we first change P so
that all messages of P are from a prefix-free language, and so it is possible to detect
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when a message of P ends. This can be done with at most constant bit blowup [32].

3.7.1

Algorithm

The main simulating algorithm P 0 (Algorithm 5) remains unchanged in this setting.
Only the sending and receiving algorithms need to change to reflect the fact that
the message to be sent may be longer than a single call to Er (, ) can support. In
Algorithms 6 and 7 below, we highlight the necessary changes in red. For any given
round r, we denote by Word-Params(r) the function which returns a tuple (wr , κr )
where wr is the word length in that round and κr is the key length in this round. These
values are computed in the same way as the previous case. We analyze Algorithms 6
and 7 in Section 3.8.
Algorithm 6 Message exchange algorithm for the sender.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:

procedure SEND-MSG(m)
. b is a persistent variable for the parity bit. On the first call to SEND-MSG,
b is set to 0. On subsequent calls it is whatever it was set to on the previous call.
j←0
while j < |m|
(wr , κr ) ← Word-Params(r)
Generate random key kA of length κt .
Send Er (KEY?, kA ).
M1 ← wr bits from the receiver.
if IsSilence (M1 ) then
. Assume the receiver has already terminated.
b ← ¬b
Stay silent for 2wr time steps and return
else
(x, k) ← Dr (M1 )
if k 6= kA then
Stay silent for 2wr time steps.
else
kB ← x
M ← m[j, j + κt ]
. Next κt bits of m
Send Er ((M, b), kB ).
M2 ← wr bits from the receiver.
if IsSilence (M2 ) then
j ← j + κt
b ← ¬b
return
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Algorithm 7 Message exchange algorithm for the receiver.
1:
2:

3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:

procedure RECEIVE-MSG( )
. b̂, µ, λ are persistent variables for the parity bit, the partially received message, and length of the recorded message, respectively. On the first call to
RECEIVE-MSG, b̂ ← 0, µ ← ∅, λ ← 0. On subsequent calls these variables
are whatever they were set to on the previous call.
(wr , κr ) ← Word-Params(r)
M10 ← wr bits on the channel from the sender.
if IsSilence (M10 ) then
Stay silent for 3wr time steps.
else
(x0 , k 0 ) ← Dr (M10 )
if x0 6= KEY? then
Send noise for wr time steps.
Stay silent for 2wr time steps.
else
kA ← k 0 .
Generate random key kB of length κt .
Send Er (kB , kA ).
M20 ← wr bits on the channel from the sender.
(x00 , k 00 ) ← Dr (M20 )
if k 00 6= kB then
Send noise for wr time steps.
else
(M 0 , b0 ) ← x00
if µ = ∅ then
if b0 6= b̂ then
λ ← |M 0 |
µ ← M0
else
if b0 6= b̂ then
λ ← |M 0 |
Append M 0 to µ.
else
Replace last λ bits of µ with M 0 .
λ ← |M 0 | do
if µ is a completed message of L then
Record the message µ from the sender.
µ←∅
b̂ ← b0
Stay silent for wr time steps.
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3.8

Analysis of Algorithms 6 and 7

3.8.1

Correctness

Lemma 22. Assume Alice calls SEND-MSG(m) in some round r1 for some message
m and bit b. Then the following hold: (1) Alice returns from SEND-MSG(m) in some
round r3 ≥ r1 ; and (2) either Bob records the message m (line 34 of Algorithm 7)
in exactly one round r2 where r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 , or Bob does not record the message m
between rounds r1 and r3 because he terminated in P.
Proof. We first show that if Alice calls SEND-MSG(m) in round r1 , then there must
exist some round r3 ≥ r1 in which this call returns. Since the adversary’s budget is
finite, there must be some round, r4 , after which no bits are ever flipped. If the call
returns before or during round r4 , then part (1) is proven, so we only consider the
cases where the call extends past round r4 . Let m0 be the part of the message that
remains to be sent. For i ≥ 1 consider round r4 + i. There are two possibilities:
(a) After Alice has sent a key request in round r4 + i, she hears silence and the call
returns, or;
(b) Alice correctly receives Bob’s key, and uses it to send the next piece of m which
Bob correctly receives. Next, Alice hears silence from Bob. If this was the last
piece of the message, this ends the call. If not, the call continues into round
r4 + i + 1 with a shorter remaining message.
Since the message has finite length, eventually (a) occurs. Thus, in every case there
is some round r3 ≥ r1 in which the call to SEND-MSG(m) returns.

We now prove part (2) of our lemma. We first show that the message m is recorded
at most once by Bob in the rounds r1 to r3 . By Lemma 15 (2(c)), the bit b0 corresponding to the last partial message for m received by Bob in line 21 of Algorithm 7
must be the same as the bit b sent by Alice for this partial message from rounds r1 to
r3 . Since this bit never changes, Bob will record m (line 34 of Algorithm 7) at most
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once in rounds r1 to r3 .

If Bob terminated in P before round r3 , then part (2) of our lemma statement does
not require Bob to record the message m, and so that part or our lemma is trivially
true. Thus, for the remainder of the proof, we assume that Bob has not terminated
in P before round r3 and we must show that he records the message m exactly once.

We do this by induction on the length of m. Note that since m is a message from
P, it belonged to L , so it is actually possible for Bob to record m. If m is short enough
to be sent in one piece, then consider round r3 in which the call to SEND-MSG(m)
returns. Let M1 be the string read by Alice on line 8 of Algorithm 6. Since Bob has
not terminated in P, Lemma 15 (2(b)) guarantees that Bob sent M1 , and therefore
the call to Algorithm 6 does not return on line 8. Hence, it returns on line 25. Since
this is the last round, M1 must correctly decode to (kB , kA ) in Algorithm 6. Thus,
Alice sends Bob m using kB and hears silence subsequently. Thus, Bob must have
actually been silent at this time (Lemma 15 (1)), which only happens if he has either
now or previously recorded m. Hence, Bob must have recorded the message m in
some round r2 ≤ r3 .

Now as an induction hypothesis suppose the conclusion about Bob recording a
message exactly once is true for all strings s shorter than m. Suppose m requires
more than one piece to be sent. Then since Alice continues to resend the first piece
m0 until she has received confirmation that Bob has received it, there is some round
r10 < r3 in which Alice receives this confirmation. Since the same parity bit b for
this piece has been sent in all rounds r ≤ r10 , and received bit b0 agrees with b in
each of these rounds, Bob stores the partial message m0 exactly once. Let m1 be
the remaining portion of m. Clearly it is shorter than m. Now let us examine the
control flow throughout the algorithm from round r10 onwards. This looks exactly like
a call to SEND-MSG(m1 ) with the persistent variable b now set to ¬b, together with
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a RECEIVE-MSG call in which the persistent variables b̂ set to ¬b̂, µ set to m0 , and λ
set to |m0 |. By induction hypothesis, there is exactly one round r2 with r10 ≤ r2 ≤ r3
during which Bob records m0 ◦ m1 , which is in L . But since m = m0 ◦ m1 , this
concludes the proof.
Lemma 23. The following holds for protocol P 0 . For any message m that Bob records
(line 34 of Algorithm 7) in some round r2 , Alice started a call to SEND-MSG(m) in
a round r1 ≤ r2 and returned from that call in some round r3 ≥ r2 .
Proof. Consider the round r2 in which the Bob records a message m (line 34 of Algorithm 7). Suppose µ = ∅ when RECEIVE-MSG was called in round r2 . Then m
arose in the first component of Dr (M10 ) in line 21 of Algorithm 7, where the second
component correctly matched kB . Specifically the first component must have been
(m, b) for some b. Thus, by Lemma 15 (2(c)), Alice must have sent Er ((m, b), kB ),
during the transmission of M10 . Hence, Alice must be in a call to SEND-MSG with
some message m̂ from L , with m as a contiguous substring, and this call must have
begun in some round r1 ≤ r2 . We must show that m̂ = m. Suppose m is a proper
contiguous substring of m̂, i.e., m̂ = m0 ◦ m ◦ m1 where at least one of m0 and m1
is not ∅. Then m0 is not in L (since it is a prefix of m̂). Since Alice would not
proceed to sending m until she had confirmed that Bob had received m0 , she must
have previously received that confirmation, meaning that Bob previously received m0 .
But in that case, Bob would have that stored as a partial message, contradicting the
assumption that µ = ∅ when RECEIVE-MSG was called in round r2 . Thus m0 = ∅.
But that means that m is a prefix of m̂. Since both m and m̂ are in L , it follows
that m1 = ∅ and m̂ = m. Thus, Alice called SEND-MSG(m).

Next suppose µ = s when RECEIVE-MSG was called in round r2 , for some string
s 6= ∅. Then m = s ◦ x, where x is the string Bob decodes in round r2 . We first
induct on the length of s to prove that Alice’s call to SEND-MSG had as input, some
message m̂ from L , such that m̂ contains s ◦ x = m as a contiguous substring, i.e.,
m̂ = m0 ◦ m ◦ m1 for some strings m0 , m1 . The case of s = ∅ was shown above.
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Thus, assume there exist rounds ρ0 < ρ1 ≤ r2 and non-empty strings s0 and s1 , with
s = s0 ◦ s1 such that µ = s0 when RECEIVE-MSG was called in round ρ0 and µ = s1
when RECEIVE-MSG was called in round ρ1 . Here, ρ0 and ρ1 are the first rounds
with this property. Then Bob decoded s0 in round ρ0 − 1 and s1 in round ρ1 − 1. Furthermore, Bob has not decoded any other string between decoding s0 and s1 . Then,
it follows from the induction hypothesis that s0 and s1 came from Alice, so that Alice
must be in call to SEND-MSG during the course of which she sends encoded strings
s0 , s1 , x in this order. Moreover, she cannot have sent any other encoded strings in
between, because had she done so, she would not have moved on from it without acknowledgement that Bob decoded it. Since we stipulate that Bob did not decode any
other strings, it follows that the input to Alice’s call to SEND-MSG had m = s0 ◦s1 ◦x
as a contiguous substring so that m̂ = m0 ◦ m ◦ m1 for some strings m0 , m1 . Note that
m0 is not in L . Now, when Bob decoded s0 , the call to RECEIVE-MSG was passed
∅. Thus, from the discussion in the beginning of the proof, it follows that m0 = ∅
and therefore m1 = ∅ and m̂ = m. Thus, in all cases, Alice did actually have a call
to SEND-MSG(m) that began in some round r1 ≤ r2 .

Finally, we know by Lemma 22(1) that every call to SEND-MSG ends in some
round r3 . Since, by the above, Alice is in the call during round r2 , it must be the case
that Alice returns from the call in some round r3 ≥ r2 .

3.8.2

Resource Costs

We now analyze the total number of bits sent by P 0 when the messages in P may be
longer than a single bit. Let α be the average message length in P.
Lemma 24. If P 0 succeeds, then it has the following resource costs.


+
T
.
• The number of bits sent is O L 1 + α1 log nL
δ

n 


o
n(L+T )
1
• The latency is O max Λp 1 + α log
+ Tp
where p is any comδ
p

munication path in the asynchronous simulation of P, Λp is the latency of p,
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and Tp is the total number of bits flipped by the adversary on edges in p.
Proof. Call a string M encoded in Step 20 of Algorithm 6 a submessage. To upperbound the number of bits sent, we assume pessimistically that in every round of P 0 ,
there is an attempt to send exactly one submessage. This maximizes the number of
bits sent since word sizes increase with time.
Note that each message consists of at most 1 submessage that is not of length
some constant times the word length in that round. Thus, the number of progressive
rounds is no more than the number of messages sent, L/α, plus the largest integer x
such that the number of bits sent in x rounds equals c1 L for some constant c1 > 1.
).
By Lemma 20, x = O(L/ log nL
δ
The number of non-progressive rounds is O



T
log(n(T +1)/δ)



, by the same argument

as from the proof of Lemma 21.
Let the number of rounds
nL
)+O
r = L/α + O(L/ log
δ



T
log (n(T + 1)/δ)


.

Then by Lemma 19, we can bound τ (r) as

τ (r) ≤

where z = O



T
log(n(T +1)/δ)




L/α + O

L
log(nL/δ)


+z



log

. Simplifying this, we get τ (r) = O

nr 
δ



1
α

log



n(L+T )
δ




+L+T .

Finally, to bound the latency, we note that the argument above holds for any
communication path p in the asynchronous simulation of P.

Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 14, no failure event happens with probability at
least 1 − δ, and by Lemma 18, in such a situation, P 0 terminates with an asynchronous simulation of P. Upon correct termination, the resource cost bounds hold
by Lemma 24.
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3.9

Coding Rate of our Algorithm

In most prior work it is assumed that the noise rate of the channel(s) is known and
may be used as a parameter in the design of the algorithm. The parameter of interest
then is the rate of the designed code, or coding rate. The coding rate of an interactive
communication algorithm is the number of bits sent in P 0 divided by the number of
bits sent in P.
In our work we do not assume that the noise rate is known in advance, but only
require that the adversary flip a finite number of bits. In order to compare our result
with other work, we compute the coding rate of our algorithm as a function of the
a posteriori noise rate. Such a comparison is only meaningful when the adversary’s
total budget is less than L, the length of P, so for this section we will assume that
T < L.
Let L0 denote the length of P 0 . Theorem 1 states that our algorithm achieves

+CT for some constant C, where δ is the permissible failure
L0 ≤ CL 1 + α1 log nL
δ
probability for the algorithm and α is the average message length in P. Furthermore,

since T < L this translates to the absolute upper bound L0 ≤ CL 2 + α1 log nL
,
δ
which simplifies as follows:


1
n(L + T )
L ≤ CL 2 + log
α
δ



1
2nL
≤ CL 2 + log
α
δ
0



(3.1)
(3.2)

Let ε = T /L0 be the a posteriori noise rate. Then T = εL0 . Making this
substitution for T in (3.1), and using (3.2) to bound the L0 inside the log, we



1
n(L+εCL(2+ α
log( 2nL
0
1
δ )))
0
have L ≤ CL 2 + α log
. Dividing by L, we get LL ≤
δ


1
n(L+εCL(2+ α
log( 2nL
C
δ )))
2C + α log
which the same as saying that
δ
"


 #
L0
C
C log(2nL/δ)
≤ 2C +
log(nL/δ) + log 1 + ε 2C +
.
L
α
α
Finally, using log(1 + x) ≤ x on the second logarithm in this expression, we get
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L0
L


≤ 2C +

C log(2nL/δ)
α



1+

εC
α


.

To summarize, for the worst case where α = 1, the above shows that we achieve
a coding rate that increases linearly with the noise rate ε and with the logarithm of
nL/δ. In particular, the coding rate is O((1 + ε) log(nL/δ)). For arbitrary α, we
achieve a coding rate of O((1 + ε/α) log(nL/δ)/α).
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Chapter 4
The Robust ANTS Problem
How can multiple simple searchers best find a target? Feinerman, Korman and others
formalized this question by defining the ANTS (Ants Nearby Treasure Search) problem, where many searchers, all starting at a central location, seek a target hidden in
the plane [43, 44, 42]. The searchers are simple in that they cannot communicate and
have few bits of initial knowledge, called advice, when they first leave the nest. Research on this problem now extends in multiple directions including: tradeoffs between
computational resources and knowledge of searchers and the search time [42, 74, 39];
tradeoffs between communication and search time [75, 73, 20]; fault-tolerance [73];
handling asynchronous searchers [75, 40]; and game theoretic analysis of rational
searchers [31].
In this chapter, we extend results on the ANTS problem in two key directions.
First, we design the first algorithm for ANTS that is robust to adversarial failures, and
requires no communication among searchers, as is required in the original problem
formulation. Importantly, our algorithm can tolerate all but 1 searcher crashing, and
the efficiency of our algorithm decreases only linearly with the actual number of faults,
even when this number is not known in advance.
Second, as a generalization of the ANTS problem, we consider finding a type
of convex region in the 2-dimensional plane, rather than finding a vertex on the
grid. In particular, we define a shape to be a convex shape with ratio of diameter

63

to width a fixed constant. Recall that the diameter of a convex shape in the plane
is the largest distance between two parallel lines that both touch the boundary of
the shape, and that the width is the smallest such distance. For example, a shape
can be a circle, regular polygon, or rectangle with constant aspect ration, but it can
not be a rectangle that has aspect ration that is not a constant. Our motivation for
considering this type of shape is that targets are likely to be large or to be colocated,
in both biological [57, 18] and engineering systems [60].
Our algorithm makes use of the Golden Ratio, both to ensure robustness and to
ensure good coverage during the search. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm
is the first for the ANTS problem that makes use of this value.
Our Model N searchers start at a central location, called the nest. A convex shape of
diameter D is placed adversarially at a distance L from the nest, where L is measured
from the nest to the geometric center of the shape. The searchers are synchronous
in the sense that they each take one unit of time to traverse an edge in the grid and
local computation is instantaneous. The searchers cannot communicate with each
other and have zero bits of initial knowledge. We measure the time it takes for some
searcher to first locate the shape. We refer to this as the search time of our algorithm.
Our failure model is based on an adaptive adversary considered in [73]. In particular,
an omniscient adversary chooses t < N searchers that suffer crash failures at times
chosen by the adversary. This model is equivalent to that of Feinerman, Korman et
al. [44, 42, 43], except that we search for a convex shape in the infinite plane, rather
than a single vertex on an infinite grid.

4.1

Our Results

Our upper bound, summarized in the theorem below, considers N searchers looking
for a shape of diameter D at distance L, with t < N crash failures.
Theorem 2. There exists an algorithm, GoldenFA, that in the presence of up to t <
N crash failures, is able to locate a shape of unknown diameter D, placed adversarially
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Algorithm

Robustness

F&K Search (advice)

Not Robust

F&K Search (no advice)

Not Robust

GoldenFA

t<N

Runtime

2
O L + LN for D = Θ(1)



1+ε
L2
O L + N log N for fixed
ε > 0 and D = Θ(1)



2
log
L
O L + L N(t+1)
D


Table 4.1: A comparison of the performance and robustness guarantees of GoldenFA
and the algorithms by Feinerman and Korman [43] (abbreviated as F&K). While the
latter are not provably robust against adversarial crash failures, GoldenFA can
efficiently handle all but one searchers to fail, even when these failures are scheduled
by an adaptive adversary.



2
log
L
search
at an unknown distance L from the nest, in expected O L + L N(t+1)
D
time, while using zero bits of advice.
Notably GoldenFA requires zero bits of advice: it is uniform in that the searchers
know nothing about N , and have no unique identifiers.
Additionally, we prove lower-bounds, showing that the expected run time of GoldenFA is asymptotically tight among a class of spoke-based algorithms. A spoke-based
algorithm is one where the searchers only search along line segments, where each
line-segment has an end-point in the nest, the central location where the searchers all
start. See Section 4.7 for details.

4.2

Novelty and Technical Challenges

Our upper bound makes critical use of the Golden Ratio. In particular, we use the fact
that the golden ratio is difficult to approximate rationally. In particular, we can write
any number as a (possibly infinite) continued fraction [68] of the form x1 +

1
x2 + x

1
3 +...

,

where the xi values are all integers for i ≥ 1. The degree to which the original number
is well-approximated by a finite continued fraction depends on how large the xi values
are. When xi = 1 for all i ≥ 1, we obtain an irrational number that is most difficult
to approximate. To find this most difficult irrational number, we set y = 1 + y1 , and
solve the resulting quadratic equation to obtain a solution y =
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√
1+ 5
,
2

which is the

celebrated Golden Ratio φ.
Using φ to spread-out spokes. In our algorithm, searchers proceed from the nest
in line segments that we call spokes. Each new spoke is oriented at arc length φ, along
the unit circle, from the previous one. The fact that φ is difficult to approximate with
a rational number has useful implications in ensuring the angles between spokes are
“well-spread”. For example, if we start at the point 0 on a unit circle, and iteratively
add points by moving clockwise by arc distance φ, then we will end up with near
uniform distance between points (See Lemma 27 and [70, 106]). In particular, if x
spokes are added this way, then the maximum arc length on a unit circle between
neighboring spokes is O (1/x) by the Three Gap Theorem (see Lemma 27). This
allows us to locate the shape efficiently, when D is unknown. Interestingly, this has
connections to how plants add florets, leaves and petals as they grow [91]. If the
next leaf is added by moving arc length φ along a unit circle, this ensures that leaves
are well-spread in order to increase their total intersection with sunlight without
interference.
Using φ to handle failures. In our algorithm, each searchers creates the first spoke
at a random heading and then iteratively proceeds to the next spoke by moving arc
distance φ along the unit circle. Thus, even in the presence of t = N − 1 failures, the
gaps between the spokes generated by the single remaining searcher decrease linearly
and the shape is found. This way, our algorithm eventually succeeds even when all
but one searcher crashes.
Unknown L. Since L is unknown, we must carefully balance increasing spoke lengths
and decreasing arc lengths between spokes over time. Simple doubling of spoke lengths
over time gives is inefficient. Instead, our algorithm proceeds in epochs, where in
epoch i, we search along spokes of length 20 , 21 , . . . , 2i−1 . In each epoch, we ensure
that the amount of time spent searching along spokes of length 2j is the same for all
0 ≤ j < i. We do this by having 2i−1 spokes of length 20 , 2i−2 spokes of length 21 ,
and so on up to 20 spokes of length 2i−1 (see Figure 4.2). Additionally, the angles
between these spokes is determined using the Golden Ratio so that the angular gaps
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decrease linearly with the number of spokes.

4.3

Related Work

Search is a fundamental problem in biology, where survival depends on search for
mates, prey and other resources. It is also a common problem in robotics and mobile
computing. Collective search, where multiple searchers must coordinate, is a key
problem in computer science, robotics and in social insects. Ant- and bee-inspired
algorithms have been particularly influential in swarm robotics research [101, 72, 66].
Golden Ratio. Our algorithms make critical use of the celebrated Golden Ratio.
This ratio is the limit of the ratio of consecutive numbers in the Fibonacci sequence.
Fibonacci generated the sequence as an idealized model of a reproducing rabbit population assuming overlapping generations [37]. It was documented in India many
centuries earlier, and has been observed in numerous biological systems including the
arrangement of pine cones, unfurling of fern leaves, and the arrangement of sunflower
seeds that optimally fills the circular area of the flower [91]. The Golden Ratio and
Fibonacci numbers have been used in computer science for various applications like obtaining optimal schedules for security games [67], Fibonacci hashing [70], bandwidth
sharing [64], data structures [48] and game theoretic models for blocking-resistant
communication [69].
Crash Faults. To the best of our knowledge, work by Langner et al. [73] is the
only other result that tolerates adversarial crash failures for a problem similar to
ANTS. However, their model significantly deviates from ANTS in that they allow
communication. In particular, constant-sized messages can be exchanged between
searchers when they are both at the same location. Additionally, their searchers are
much more restricted than ours in that they are modeled by finite-state automata.
They describe an algorithm that locates a single target in O (L + L2 /N + Lt) time,
while tolerating t ≤ cN crash failures for some constant c < 1. In contrast, our
algorithm can handle any t < N − 1, and does not require communication.
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4.4

Technical Preliminaries

Let φ = (1 +

√

5)/2 denote the Golden ratio. For m ≥ 1, let Fm denote the mth

Fibonacci number, so that F1 = F2 = 1 and Fm = Fm−1 + Fm−2 for all m ≥ 3. Given
integer n, let m(n) denote the index of the largest Fibonacci number not greater than
n.
Lemma 25. For all x ≥ 1, the following properties hold:


1. blogφ x + 1c ≤ m(x) ≤ logφ x + 2 .
2.

1
φ3 x

≤ φ−m(x) ≤ x1 .

Proof. For (1), using the fact that Fr ≤ φr−1 for all r, it holds that Fblogφ x+1c ≤
φblogφ x+1c−1 ≤ x. Similarly, since Fr ≥ φr−2 for all r, it holds that Fdlogφ x+2e ≥
φdlogφ x+2e−2 ≥ x. For (2), using the result obtained in (1), we obtain φ−m(x) ≤
φ−blogφ x+1c ≤ x1 . Similarly, φ−m(x) ≥ φ−dlogφ x+2e ≥

1
.
φ3 x

We define a unit circle as a circle around the nest with circumference one. Let
α be the arc length on the unit circle made by the spokes that are tangential to the
shape.
Lemma 26. The following properties hold true for α:
1. α =
2.

D
2πL

1
π

sin−1

≤α≤

D
2L


.

3D
.
4πL

Proof. (1) Follows from definition. (2) Follows from Maclaurin expansion [71] of
sin−1 x, from which it can be shown that x ≤ sin−1 x ≤ 3x/2. Moreover, this can be
reduced to anything bounded away from 1 for sufficiently small x.
Our analysis makes use of the following result regarding the Three Gap Theorem by
Swierczkowski [106] (also known as the Steinhaus Conjecture) for Golden-ratio based
gaps between successive points on the circumference of a unit circle (see Figure 4.1).
The last sentence of the following lemma follows immediately from Lemma 25(2).
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Figure 4.1: A schematic of the gaps induced by points placed on the unit circle,
following Lemma 27. When the arc distance between successive points is φ ≡ φ−1
mod 1, then the gaps decrease as the number of points increase.
Lemma 27 (Restatement of Corollary 2 from [106]). Let C be a circle of circumference 1 and p0 be a fixed starting point on C. For k ≥ 0, let pk be the point which makes
an arc of length kφ from p0 , measured clockwise. Let n ≥ 1 and Fm be the largest
Fibonacci number no more than n. Then, the set of points Pn = {p0 , p1 , . . . , pn }
partition C into disjoint arcs, each of which has length φ−m , φ−m+1 or φ−m+2 . In
particular, this implies that every disjoint arc has length between

1
φ3 n

and

φ2
.
n

In the rest of the chapter, we will assume circular shapes but our results hold for
all convex shapes where the ratio of the diameter to the width is a fixed constant.
We assume that L is the distance from the nest to the center of the circular shape.
For simplicity, we present our algorithms in R2 with Euclidean distances, but our
√
results hold with at most a 2 blowup in the grid with Manhattan distances, which
appear in the existing work that consider the search-space to be an infinite discrete
2D-grid [43, 89].

4.5

Our Algorithm

GoldenFA. We now present GoldenFA, which is given as Algorithm 8. The algorithm proceeds in epochs numbered iteratively starting at i = 1. In epoch number,
i, each searcher initially choses a random initial heading direction. Then for all j,
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2

NEST

1

1
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Epoch 2
2 spokes of length 1
1 spoke of length 2

Epoch 3
4 spokes of length 1
2 spokes of length 2
1 spoke of length 4

Figure 4.2: A schematic of GoldenFA is shown for the spokes made by two searchers
in epochs 2 and 3 (red solid lines for searcher 1 and green dotted lines for searcher 2).
Both searchers choose a random initial heading at the beginning of every epoch.
Algorithm 8 The GoldenFA Algorithm.
1: Each searcher independently performs the following steps:
2: i ← 1
3: while shape not found do
4:
direction ← uniformly random heading on the unit circle
5:
for j ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1} do
6:
Traverse 2i−j spokes of length 2j . The first spoke is at heading direction.
Each subsequent spoke has heading that increases clockwise by arc distance of φ,
along the unit circle, from the heading of the previous spoke.
7:
i←i+1
1 ≤ j ≤ (i − 1), the searcher traverses along 2i−j spokes of length j. For each value
of j, the first of these spokes is at heading direction, and each subsequent spoke has
heading that increases clockwise along the unit circle at arc length of φ from the prePi−1 i−j
vious spoke. Thus in epoch i, a total of j=0
2 = 2i+1 − 1 spokes are traversed. If
the treasure is not found after these traversals, epoch i ends and epoch i + 1 begins.
Figure 4.2 illustrates two epochs of GoldenFA when N = 2.
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4.6

Analysis

We now analyze GoldenFA and compute its runtime as a function of the unknown
parameters: shape diameter, its distance from the nest, the number of searchers and
the number of crash failures. In the following, all log terms are base 2.
Lemma 28. In epoch i ≥ log L, the probability that a single searcher finds the shape
is at least α2i−(log L)−5 , where α ≥

D
.
2πL

2

In any epoch i ≥ log L + log φα + 1, a searcher

finds the shape with probability 1.
Proof. When i ≥ log L, there will be 2i−dlog Le spokes of length at least L, where the
first of these spokes has a uniformly random orientation, and the remainder are spread
out at successive clockwise arc distances of φ. By Lemma 27, the maximum arc length
between any neighboring pair of these 2i−dlog Le spokes is φ2 2−i+dlog Le . By Lemma 26,
if any of these spokes intersect an arc of length α, where α ≥

D
,
2πL

then the searcher

2

will find the shape. Thus, for i ≥ log L + log φα + 1, a searcher is guaranteed to find
the treasure.
By Lemma 27, the minimum arc length between any neighboring pair of x spokes
is

1
.
φ3 x

Thus, when x ≤

1
,
αφ3

all spokes are arc distance at least α apart. If there are x

such spokes of length at least L, the probability that one of these spokes intersects the
shape is xα. To see this, imagine fixing the x spokes, and then letting the α length arc
associated with the shape move uniformly at random on the circumference of the unit
circle. The total measure of locations where the shape may fall so that it intersects a
spoke is then xα. Hence, when log L ≤ i ≤ dlog Le + log φ31α , the probability that a
single searcher finds the shape is at least α2i−dlog Le ≥ 2i−(log L)−1 .
2

Finally, note that for dlog Le + log φ31α < i < log L + log φα + 1, the probability that
a single searcher finds the shape is at least 1/φ3 . Thus, in this range, the probability
of finding the treasure is at least α φ15 2i−dlog Le ≥ α2i−(dlog Le+4) ≥ α2i−(log L)−5 .
Theorem 3. In the presence of up to t < N crash failures, GoldenFA takes an



2
expected number of times steps that is O L + L N(t+1)
log
L
.
D
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Proof. First, we consider the case where 2(t + 1) > N . By Lemma 28, when i ≥
2

log L + log φα + 1, all searchers will find the shape. Thus, in this case, the total time
of GoldenFA is no more than
log L+log

φ2

X α +1



i

i2 = O

i=1

Lφ2
Lφ2
log
α
α


.

This is the claimed number of time steps when t = θ(N ), since α = θ(D/L).
Next, assume that 2(t + 1) ≤ N . For any epoch i, let Si be a random variable
giving the number searchers that find the shape in epoch i. By Lemma 28, and
2

linearity of expectation, we have that for log L ≤ i ≤ log L + log φα + 1,
E(Si ) ≥ N α2i−(log L)−5 ,

where α ≥

D
.
2πL

Since each searcher finds the treasure independently, we can use

Chernoff bounds on Si (See [36], Exercise 1.1). These show that P r(Si < (1/2)µL ) ≤
e−µL /8 , where µL = N α2i−(log L)−5 is a lower bound on the expected value. Let


2(t + 1)
i = (log L) + 5 + max 0, log
.
Nα
∗

Then E(Si ) ≥ 2(t + 1), when i ≥ i∗ and 2(t + 1) ≤ N . Thus, for i ≥ i∗ ,
i−(log L)−8

P r(Si < t + 1) ≤ e−N α2

.

2

This bound holds even for i ≥ log L + log φα + 1, since for i in that range, P r(Si <
t + 1) = 0, since each searcher finds the shape with probability 1.
Let X be a random variable giving the number of epochs until more than t
searchers find the shape. Note that P r(X ≥ i) ≤ P r(Si−1 < t + 1), where P r(S0 <
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t + 1) = 1. Then, we can bound the expected search time of our algorithm as follows.
X

i2i P r(X ≥ i) =

i≥1

X

i2i P r(Si−1 < t + 1)

i≥1

≤

X
1≤i<i∗

i2i +

X

i2i e−N α2

i−(log L)−8

i≥i∗

Let S1 be the value of the first sum. Note that:

S1 =

X

i2i

1≤i<i∗






L(t + 1)
L(t + 1)
= O L log L +
log
αN
αN
Let S2 be the value of the second sum. Note that:

S2 =

X

i−(log L)−8

i2i e−N α2

i≥i∗
∗

X

i∗

X

≤ 2i∗ 2i

j+i∗ −(log L)−9

j2j e−N α2

j≥1

≤ 2i∗ 2



L
∗
exp ln j + j ln 2 − 2j+i −(log N α )−9

j≥1

In the above, the second line holds by noting that for all j ≥ 1 and x ≥ 1, (x+j)2x+j ≤
2(x2x )(j2j ), and letting x = i∗ . Next, we bound the exponent:
L
∗
ln j + j ln 2 − 2j+i −(log N α )−9 ≤ ln j + j ln 2 − 2j−3

≤ −j


In the above, the first line holds since i∗ = (log L) + 5 + max 0, log 2(t+1)
≥ 5+
Nα
log 2L(t+1)
≥ 6 + log NLα . The second line holds when j ≥ 7, since then ln j + j ln 2 −
Nα
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2j−3 ≤ −j. Hence, the infinite summation is O(1). Thus, we have that

S2 ≤ 2i∗ 2i

∗

X



L
∗
exp ln j + j ln 2 − 2j+i −(log N α )−9

j≥1






L(t + 1)
L(t + 1)
log
= O L log L +
αN
αN
By Lemma 26, α ≥

D
,
2πL

so the total expected cost of GoldenFA is:


 2


 2
L (t + 1)
L (t + 1)
log
.
O L log L +
ND
ND
Finally, note that log

l

L2 (t+1)
ND

m

= O(log L + log(t + 1) − log N − log D) = O(log L),

since N ≥ t + 1.
Thus, we can simplify the above to:

O

L2 (t + 1)
L+
ND




log L .

Note that this is tight since if the log term on the right is less than log L, it means
that

4.7

L2 (t+1)
ND

≤ L, in which case the first summand dominates.

Tight Lower Bound for Robust ANTS Problem

We now prove a lower bound on the number of time steps that any spoke-based
algorithm must take to locate the shape in the presence of adversarial crash failures.
Theorem 4. In the presence of up to t < N crash failures, any spoke-based algorithm



2
requires Ω L + L N(t+1)
log
L
time steps to locate the shape.
D
Proof. By Yao’s lemma [113], the search time of the best randomized algorithm equals
the search time of the best deterministic algorithm against a known randomized adversary. Thus, we compute the search time for the best deterministic algorithm against
a known but randomized adversarial placement of the treasure.
Adversarial Strategy. Let x be a positive integer and y be an integer chosen
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uniformly at random in [0, x]. Let L = 2y and L/D = 2x−y . Choose an integer z
uniformly at random in [0, L/D]. Let the treasure be an ellipse with diameter D and
an arbitrary small width. Place this ellipse so that its center is at distance L from the
nest, in the direction from the nest that is oriented at arc distance

zD
L

along the unit

circle. Rotate the ellipse so that its diameter is perpendicular to the ray connecting
the nest and the center of the ellipse.
Lower Bound Against This Strategy. Assume the algorithm knows the value
x, the randomized adversarial strategy above, and t, the number of faults that will
occur. The algorithm can be represented as a sequence, σ, of tuples. Each tuple
corresponds to some searcher’s first visit to a region that is a possible treasure location.
In particular, tuple (`, a) corresponds to a visit to any point in the ellipse with center
at distance ` from the nest, and orientation that is arc length a along the unit circle
centered at the nest. The tuples in σ are all sorted by time of visit to first point in
the ellipse, with ties broken arbitrarily.
First, note that there is 1 unique tuple of length 2x : (2x , 0); 2 unique tuples
of length 2x−1 : (2x−1 , 0) and (2x−1 , 1/2); 4 unique tuples of length 2x−2 : (2x−2 , 0),
(2x−2 , 1/4), (2x−2 , 1/2), (2x−2 , 3/4); and so forth. Next, observe that each unique
tuple, (`, a), appears in σ at least t + 1 times. This is necessary since each possible
ellipse must be visited by t + 1 searchers in order for the algorithm to be robust to t
adversarial faults. Finally, note that visiting any point on the ellipse corresponding to
(`, a) requires movement of Ω(`), no matter at what tuple, (`0 , a0 ) the searcher visiting
(`, a) was previously at. To see this, first note that if ` = `0 , then the distance travelled
between these two tuples is Ω(`) since there must be a trip to the nest between the
tuples, because the algorithm is spoke-based. Second, if ` 6= `0 , draw two squares
centered at the nest, one enclosing (`, a), and the other enclosing (`0 , a0 ). Then, note
that the minimum distance between the squares is Ω(`).
The expected total distance travelled by all searchers in the algorithm is then
given as follows. Select a tuple in σ uniformly at random, and sum up the lengths
of all tuples preceding, and including, the selected tuple in σ. Let X be the random
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variable giving this sum. Note that X stochastically dominates the following random
variable, X 0 : Let σ 0 be a sequence where each tuple in σ of the type (`, a) is expanded
to ` copies. Select a tuple uniformly at random in σ 0 and let X 0 be the index of the
selected tuple.
Note that E(X 0 ) is half the length of σ 0 , and that the length of σ 0 = (t + 1)x2x .
Thus, E(X) ≥ E(X 0 ) ≥ (1/2)(t + 1)x2x . Finally, note that, since there are N
searchers, the expected search time is at least the total distance travelled by all
searchers divided by N . By linearity of expectation, the expected search time is thus


x
(t+1)x2x
(t+1)L2 log L
x
2
.
Since
2
=
L
/D,
then
=
Ω
.
at least (t+1)x2
2N
2N
ND

4.8

Empirical Evaluation

We implement GoldenFA and algorithms from [43] to empirically evaluate how
search time changes as we increase: the ratio of the diameter of shape to distance to
shape (D/L); the number of searchers (N ); and the fraction of random crash failures
(t/N ). We compare GoldenFA to algorithms from Feinerman and Korman in [43].

4.8.1

Experiment Setup

We implemented four algorithms. GoldenFA is our algorithm from Section 4.5.
F&K-Advice is Algorithm 1 from [43]; it requires O(log log N ) bits of advice. F&KNoAdvice is Algorithm 2 from [43] with  = .01; it requires zero bits of advice. Since
the value for  in Algorithm 2 is not specified in [43], we conducted experiments to
determine that the setting  = .01 performs well empirically.
GoldenFA-Heuristic is the last algorithm. In this algorithm, for epoch i ≥ 1,
there are dc(1 + α)i e spokes of length (1 + α)i , for parameters c, α > 0. Similar to the
GoldenFA, each spoke in this is at arc distance equal to the Golden Ratio from the
previous. We set c = 1.9 and α = 7, since they perform well empirically.
In all of our experiments the shape is a circle with diameter D. For each data point
plotted, 150 trials were run and the average search time was plotted. The location of
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Figure 4.3: Search time versus D/L; L = Figure 4.4: Search time versus N ; L = 500
500, N = 1, and D is varied.
and D = 4.
the shape was kept fixed throughout all trials. The search time reported is time steps,
where one time step is the amount of time it takes a searcher to travel a distance of
1. All algorithms were implemented in Python 3.6, and all experiments were run on
a Macbook Pro with 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB RAM.

4.8.2

Results

We next present our results showing how search time changes as we vary three different
values. We include plots showing results of three different experiments. Note that in
each plot, search time is the independent variable, and it is plotted on a logarithmic
scale.
Search Time versus D/L. Our first experiment tracks search time as the ratio D/L
increases, recall that D is the diameter of the circular shape, and L is the distance
to the center of the shape. The value of L is fixed at 500, and D increases from 1 to
500.
Figure 4.3 shows how search time decreases as D/L increases. As the plot shows,
search time decreases for all algorithms. GoldenFA-Heuristic consistently has the
best search time, with performance that is always between 1 and 2 orders of magnitude
better than all other algorithms, when D/L is greater than about .15. Next, in
performance, as D/L increases, are GoldenFA and F&K-NoAdvice. Initially
F&K-NoAdvice has worse search time that GoldenFA, bus as D/L increases,
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Figure 4.5: Search time versus the fraction of failures (t/N ) on a log scale. Figure 4.6: Search time versus the fraction
The failed nodes are selected uniformly of failures (t/N ) on a linear scale; L = 500,
at random, and L = 500, D = 4 and D = 4 and N = 100.
N = 100.
they both trend towards roughly similar performance. Last, in the plot is F&KAdvice, which starts out with middling performance, but does not decrease nearly
as much as the other algorithms as D/L increases.
It is surprising that F&K-NoAdvice performs better than F&K-Advice as
D/L increases, but notably, for small D/L, the order is swapped.
Search Time versus N . Our second experiment tracks search time versus the
number of searchers, N . Figure 4.4 shows the outcome of this experiment where
L = 500, D = 4, and N varies from 1 to 200. Performance of all algorithms decreases
with N .
In this plot, GoldenFA-Heuristic and F&K-NoAdvice perform approximately equally well as N grows large. The next algorithm is F&K-Advice, which
is about a factor of 3 worse than either of these algorithms for N ≥ 200. In last
place is GoldenFA, which performs strictly worse than all other algorithms, with a
performance gap of at least 1 order of magnitude, for all N ≥ 150.
Search Time versus t/N . Our last experiment tracks search time as the ratio t/N
increases, where t is the number of crash failures and N is the number of searchers.
In these experiments, we hold the following values fixed: L = 500, D = 4, N = 100;
and we vary t from 0 to 99. For each value of t, a random subset of t searchers were
removed from the algorithm after the first 100 time steps. To prevent any algorithm
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from running forever, a hard timeout was set at 108 time steps.
The results are given in Figure 4.5. Both F&K-Advice and F&K-NoAdvice
have sharply increasing search times, which both time-out before all values of t are
tested. F&K-NoAdvice times-out when t/N equals about .16; while F&K-Advice
times-out when t/N equals about .20.
Both GoldenFA and GoldenFA-Heuristic have search times that grow slowly
with increasing values of t/N . Notably, both of these algorithms still find the shape
even when there is only one searcher left at the value t = 99, which is as predicted by
our theoretical analysis.
Our theoretical analysis suggest that search time for GoldenFA and GoldenFAHeuristic would increase roughly linearly with t/N . Results from this experiment
roughly confirm this is the case (see Figure 4.6). For GoldenFA, the slope is approximately 3.98 × 106 for search time as a function of t/N . For GoldenFA-Heuristic
the slope is approximately 1.01 × 106 .
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Chapter 5
Foraging in Bounded Arenas
Central-place foraging (CPF) is a canonical task in collective robotics with applications to planetary exploration, automated mining, warehousing, and search and rescue
operations. We compare the performance of three CPFAs, variants of which have been
shown to work well in real robots: spiral-based, rotating-spoke, and random-ballistic.
To understand the difference in performance between these CPFAs, we define the price
of ignorance and show how this metric explains our previously published empirical
results. We obtain upper-bounds for expected complete collection times for each algorithm and evaluate their performance in simulation. We show that site-fidelity (i.e.
returning to the location of the last found target) and avoiding search redundancy
are key-factors that determine the efficiency of CPFAs. Our formal analysis suggests
the following efficiency ranking from best to worst: spiral, spoke, and the stochastic
ballistic algorithm.
Autonomous CPF is a fundamental task in collective robotics that involves the discovery, collection, and transportation of targets to a collection zone [112]. CPFAs have
recently received increased attention as resource collection on other planets, moons,
and asteroids by robots is planned by space agencies to enable human exploration.
Mining by autonomous vehicles and inventory collection in automated warehouses are
essentially CPF tasks in that they require efficient collection and transportation of
targets distributed within an area. Search and rescue, collection of bomb fragments
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for analysis, and robotic agriculture also motivate the study of distributed retrieval
tasks. In biology, immune systems searching for pathogens and ant-colonies searching
for targets can also be understood by analysing CPFAs.
Empirical work in real robots leads us to investigate three simple algorithms: the
SpiralCPFA [49, 97], SpokeCPFA [1], and RandCPFA [77]. Variants of these
three algorithms performed well in the NASA Swarmathon, a swarm robot foraging competition that allowed us to make direct comparisons among many different
foraging algorithms in simulations and in physical robots [1].
Our formal analysis allows us to predict the performance of these CPFAs for
large areas and swarms of robots for which experiments are currently impractical.
We formalise two principles observed in our empirical work: the importance of sitefidelity (returning to the location of the last found target) and the adverse effects of
oversampling (repeatedly searching the same area). To aid our analysis, we introduce
the price of ignorance metric. This metric is the ratio of the performance of a given
algorithm to that of an idealised omniscient algorithm. This quantifies the penalty
paid by each algorithm for not knowing target locations, which for the complete
collection task is the major determinant of CPFA performance. Our preliminary
results using this metric appeared in [?].
We note that the price of ignorance is similar to the notion of competitiveness
for online algorithms [21], which has been used in the context of foraging in [43].
However, in our application, rather than measuring competitiveness with respect to
the amount of advice available (as in [43]) we measure competitiveness with respect to
the knowledge of the locations of resources and in the ability of the foraging algorithm
to avoid repeatedly searching the same locations in the foraging arena. Additionally,
we assume a uniformly random pile placement, which is different from the adversarial
setting often analysed for online algorithms.
For each of the CPFAs, the proofs presented here provide relative upper-bounds
on the expected performance of teams of robots. These upper-bounds suggest the
ordering of algorithm performance in idealised scenarios. To test whether the ranking
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of upper-bounds holds, we run experiments using the ARGoS simulator for each of
the CPFAs. In combination, the asymptotic analysis and ARGoS simulations give us
insight into how CPFAs perform in theory and in practice.
Related Work. Seminal contributions in search and distributed foraging have
emerged in Operations Research [105], Physics [15], Computational Geometry [13]
and Robotics [29, 79, 62] (among other areas). Central place foraging has been of
fundamental interest to researchers of Swarm Intelligence because of its deep connections to social insect behaviour [50]. Generating an optimal search path that
maximises the probability of detecting a target in non-trivial environments within
a fixed time-frame is NP-complete, and minimising the mean time to detection is
NP-hard [108, 102]. Therefore, search and CPF use heuristics.
Rybski et al. [100], and Hecker and Moses [62] demonstrate that site-fidelity can
dramatically reduce search times in robot CPF in simulation and hardware experiments. So far this effect has mostly been argued empirically [85], and our result
provides some of the first theoretical evidence to explain this phenomenon.
Ghosh and Klein [56] provide a review of planar search algorithms, which is a critical component of CPFAs. Spiral search has long been known to be an optimal search
strategy for individual agents searching for single targets, both from the standpoint
of computational geometry [14] and more recently as a practical algorithm for real
robots [84]. The optimality of spiral search for multiple agents searching for a line in
the plane, and a point on a line, has also been proved [13]. We have examined the
generalisation to multiple robots empirically [49]. To our knowledge this is the first
formal analysis of multi-agent spiral and spoke CPFAs.
Feinerman et al. [45], also argue in favour of deterministic algorithms using formal analysis and establish a lower bound of Ω (Rf + R2 f /N ) for the time it takes
to collectively forage adversarially placed targets. In a slightly relaxed but biologically motivated setting of uniformly random cluster placement around the collection zone, we show that SpiralCPFA circumvents this bound and takes only
O (R2 /N + R max{f /N, 1}) time in expectation for complete collection. In fact, Ag82

χ
Tt
N
R
f
a

Price of ignorance
Total transport time
Number of searchers
Radius of the circular arena
Total number of targets
Area of a single target

Ts
Ttot
s
r
m
ps

Total search time
Total foraging time
Robot speed
Detection radius of robot
Total number of clusters
Probability of site-fidelity

Table 5.1: Notations used for the analysis of existing central place foraging algorithms.
garwal et al. recently showed that when the targets are clustered into a pile of diameter
∆, then even under adversarial placement, there exists a single-agent deterministic
foraging strategy which can locate this pile in Θ (R2 /∆) time steps [10, ?].

5.1

Theoretical Analysis

5.1.1

Formal Model

We assume N holonomic robots, which are instructed to search within a predefined
area of radius R. We assume a simple obstacle-free circular arena with a central,
stationary collection-zone. Robots begin at the collection zone and transport the
targets they discover to the collection zone. The location of the collection zone, the
number N (along with a unique identifier per robot) and the radius of the arena is
known to all robots.
We distribute f targets evenly among m clusters. These clusters are placed uniformly at random within the arena. Targets are detectable when robots are within
sensor range, r, which defines an area a around each target. Targets are stationary
and depleted on collection. The number of targets initially available for collection
(and their locations) is fixed but unknown to the robots.
We assume that the robots move at a constant speed, s and can transport only
one target at a time. After delivering a target to the collection zone, in the SpiralCPFA and SpokeCPFA robots return to the point where the search pattern was
interrupted. In the RandCPFA, robots choose with some probability ps to either
employ site-fidelity, i.e. return to the location of the last target discovered, or alterna83

tively the robot chooses a random ballistic trajectory away from the collection zone.
Site-fidelity is inspired by the behaviour of foraging ants [46]. Note that because the
SpiralCPFA and SpokeCPFA return to the point in their search pattern where
they were interrupted by collecting a target, they implicitly implement site-fidelity.
The robots do not communicate with each other in the algorithms we study4
(apart from initial assignment of search trajectories to each robot in the deterministic
algorithms). Robots can remember only the last location where they found a target
and the location of the collection zone.
Our formal model uses probabilistic, rather than adversarial, target distributions
and therefore allows tighter results than those previously published. Table 5.1 summarises our notation. We do not consider environmental effects, robot failures, sensor
or actuation error, collisions or congestion. We have considered these factors in our
previous work using experiments with real robots and realistic simulations [97]. Collisions and congestion are considered in simulations in Section 5.2.

5.1.1.1

The Omniscient Central-Place Foraging Algorithm

For our formal analysis, we need an appropriate metric to measure relative success
or failure. Our metric is the time for complete collection achieved by each algorithm
compared to the time taken by an idealised omniscient algorithm. A perfect CPFA,
for complete collection, simply has to know the location of each target a priori. The
foraging time of this omniscient algorithm is simply the time for the N robots to travel
directly to each target and return to the collection zone. Robots search in parallel,
and a centralised scheduling algorithm can ensure that each target is assigned to only
one robot. The difference between the CPFAs performance and the perfect algorithm
is an effective measure of each algorithms’ price of ignorance.
Each omniscient robot deploying this ideal algorithm will take exactly 2d/s units
of time to collect a target, which is located at distance d from the collection zone.
4

As demonstrated by Rybski et al. [100], implementation of swarm communication in real systems
may not show the expected improvement. Communication by real error-prone robots interpreting a
noisy environment can harm foraging performance by misdirecting foraging resources, a phenomena
termed misinformation cost by Pitonakova et al. [96].
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Since the expected distance is d = 2R/3 to a target, the total expected time for
complete collection by this ideal algorithm is 4Rf /(3N s).

5.1.1.2

Price of Ignorance

For a particular problem instance and a given foraging algorithm A, the price of
ignorance metric, denoted χ(A), is defined as the time taken by A to collect all
targets5 divided by that taken by the perfect algorithm:

χ(A) =

3N sTtot (A)
Ttot (A)
=
4Rf /(3N s)
4Rf

(5.1)

Thus, χ(A) must be at least 1 for any algorithm, and the most efficient algorithms
are closest to 1. We summarise our main results for the price of ignorance of three
CPFAs in Table 5.2.

5.1.2

Distributed Archimedean Spiral Algorithm

The SpiralCPFA (Figure 5.1) uses interleaving Archimedean spirals as robot search
trajectories. Each robot starts at the centre, if it finds a target, it takes it back to the
collection zone and then returns to the location where it found the target and resumes
its search. If the robot hits an arena boundary, it completes the circuit at the arena
boundary and then stops foraging. The spiral path is unique to each robot foraging
in the arena and collectively guarantees full arena coverage. Even though we analyse
a distributed Archimedean spiral, our results apply, within a constant factor, to the
square spirals of the distributed deterministic spiral search algorithm (DDSA) [49]
that we simulate in Section 5.2.
The turning angles, θ, of robots following a distributed Archimedean-spiral are
defined to be parametric in time, t such that θ = t +
vector hx, yi =

tN r
π

2πi
,
N

resulting in the movement

hcos θ, sin θi. In our proofs we use the polar representation.

5

We refer to this as the time to complete collection for algorithm A. Note that we do not address
the problem of protocol termination in this chapter and only measure the time until the last target
is collected.
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Our main results are summarised in the theorem below.
Theorem 5. ( SpiralCPFA Analysis) The following holds for foraging using SpiralCPFA:
1. Using only a single robot, the expected price of ignorance of SpiralCPFA is
at most 1 +

2.25R
rf

−

1
.
2f

2. Multiple robots reduce the expected price of ignorance of SpiralCPFA to at
√
N
most 2 + 1.67R
− 2f
. This bound is tight up to constant factors.
rf
Proof. The Archimedean Spiral is governed by the equation ` =

rθ
,
π

where (`, θ) is the

polar co-ordinate pair of the spiral path traversed by the robot and r is the detection
radius of the robot. Note that 2r is the separation between successive turns of the
spiral, which is maintained in order to provide complete coverage of the arena.
Proof for Theorem 5 (1): Let (`max , θmax ) be the angular co-ordinates for the
last point of the spiral that fits into the circular arena. Since the distance between
(0, 0) and (`max , θmax ) is R, we obtain θmax =

Rπ
.
r

Let L be the total length of the

spiral path traversed by the robot. We can bound L as follows:
r
L≤
π

Z
0

θmax

√
r 2
3R2
θ2 + 1 dθ ≤ √ θmax
<
r
2π

(5.2)

Note that in SpiralCPFA, every time the robot finds a target, it first carries that
target back to the collection zone and then resumes its search from the point where it
found the last target. Thus, to calculate the effective search time for a robot, we also
consider the distance it needs to travel back to the cluster from the collection zone for
each of the remaining f −1 targets. This gives E[Ts (SpiralCPFA)] = Ls +(f −1) 2R
≤
3s
3R2
rs

+

2R(f −1)
.
3s

Note that the expected transport time is

2Rf
,
3s

since it takes

2R
3s

time

in expectation to transport a single target back to the collection zone. Hence, the
expected total completion time for SpiralCPFA is at most

3R2
rs

+ 2R(f3s−1) + 2Rf
. This
3s

gives the expected price of ignorance as stated in the theorem.
Proof Sketch for Theorem 5 (2): SpiralCPFA can be easily adapted for
multiple robots by ensuring that each robot travels along a separate Archimedean
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Figure 5.1: Foraging path for N = 3 bots using SpiralCPFA, with a cluster placed
at the expected distance of 2R/3 from the collection zone.
Spiral path in a way that no two spirals ever intersect. For example, in the steady
state Figure 5.1 shows the foraging trajectory for N = 3 robots. Based on this,
each of the robots will now traverse a path where the distance between successive
spirals is 2rN , governed by the equation `i =

rN
θ
π i

+ (i − 1) πr . Here, (`i , θi ) are the

polar co-ordinates of the spiral path along which the ith robot travels in the arena for
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }.
Let (`i,max , θi,max ) be the angular co-ordinates for the last point traversed by the ith
robot in the arena and Li be the length of the Archimedean Spiral so traversed. Similar

to the analysis for a single robot, we obtain the following θi,max = Rπ
− (i − 1) N1
r
√
and Li ≤ πR2 /( 2rN ).
To compute the expected total transport time, note that each robot traverses an
area of 2r per unit length of the path it travels during the search. Thus, the total
√
√
area traversed by the ith robot is 2rLi ≤ 2πR2 /N . This corresponds to N2 fraction
of the arena and hence, the expected number of targets collected by any robot is at
√

most

2f
.
N

This way, we obtain E[Tt (SpiralCPFA)] =

√
2 2Rf
.
3N s

Next, we bound the expected total search time. Similar to the discussion for the
single robot, we can generalise the total expected search time for multiple robots as
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follows:



Li
2R
E[Ts (SpiralCPFA)] = max
+ E[Tt (SpiralCPFA)]i −
i
s
3s
 
Li
2R
≤ max
+ E[Tt (SpiralCPFA)] −
i
s
3s

(5.3)

Note that it holds that,

E[Ttot (SpiralCPFA)] = E[Tt (SpiralCPFA)] + E[Ts (SpiralCPFA)]

This gives,
2R
Li
+ 2E[Tt (SpiralCPFA)] −
i
s
3s
√
2
πR
4 2Rf
2R
<√
+
−
3N s
3s
2rN s

E[Ttot (SpiralCPFA)] ≤ max

The bound on the price of ignorance, as stated in the theorem, then immediately
follows.

5.1.3

Spoke Central Place Foraging Algorithm

In the SpokeCPFA (Figure 5.1), the searchers move radially away from the collection
zone until they find a target or reach the arena boundary. When a searcher returns
to the collection zone it increments its angle of departure slightly for the next spoke.
The radial search progresses around the collection zone like the hands of a clock.
This sweeping mechanism will cover the entire space in the arena. This reproduces
the spoke strategy from the NASA Swarmathon; however, in our analysis robots
return along a different path which we hypothesis will increase efficiency. The impact
of this difference is discussed in Section 5.3.
Successive turns ensure that the maximum distance between any two spokes is at
most twice the detection radius of the robots so that no cluster (even containing only
one target) will be undetected. Thus, we set the sweep angle Θ = 4 sin−1 (r/R) ≥ 4r/R
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for a total of 2π/Θ ≤ πR/(2r) sweeps. Hence, the distance travelled by the robot
to sweep the entire arena is 4Rπ/Θ ≤ πR2 /r (here, we assume that the robot moves
along one spoke and returns along the next to further reduce the time by a factor of
2). Note that the search time also takes into consideration the time taken by the robot
to travel back to the last location where it found the target6 , which in expectation is
2Rf /(3s), resulting in a total search time of at most πR2 /rs + 2Rf /(3s). The total
transport time for f targets is 2Rf /(3s), in expectation. With multiple robots, the
total time can be reduced by a factor of N by assigning each robot to its own sector.
Since the clusters are uniformly distributed, each robot forages only 1/N fraction of
the total number of targets, in expectation, and covers a search area that is 1/N
fraction of the whole arena. Thus, expected price of ignorance of SpokeCPFA is
3πR
4rf

+ 1.

5.1.4

Randomised Ballistic Central-Place Foraging Algorithm

In RandCPFA, the robot chooses a random direction from the collection zone and
moves in a straight line path along that direction until either a target is found (either
in direct line of sight or within the detection radius) or a pre-specified distance is
reached (which in this case is the arena radius R). We state the main results for this
algorithm in the theorem below and provide a proof sketch thereafter.
Theorem 6. ( RandCPFA Analysis) The following holds for stochastic foraging
using RandCPFA:
1. Using only a single robot, the expected price of ignorance of RandCPFA is at
most

πR
r

−

1
2

without site fidelity or considering the effect of target depletion.

2. Deploying site fidelity is expected to strictly decrease the price of ignorance to

 1
m πR
m
at most f r + 2 1 − f , without considering the effect of target depletion.
6
Note that the time taken for the general case where multiple targets can exist along a single
spoke is never more than the bound obtained here. This is because the distance covered by the robot
that takes multiple trips along a single spoke (for, say, f 0 targets along the spoke) until it reaches
the end of the arena is bounded from above by that covered by f 0 single trips along different spokes.
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between the angular region in which the cluster is detected
in a single ballistic walk and the area of the cluster and detection radius of the robot.
3. The depletion of piles over time (due to foraging) causes the price of ignorance
to increase to at most

(2π ln 2)N R
r

+ 21 , without site fidelity.

4. When both site fidelity and depletion effects are considered, the expected price of
ignorance of RandCPFA is at most

πR
r

−

N
.
2f

Proof. We begin by computing the likelihood p of finding at least one target cluster
in a random chosen direction from the collection zone (see Figure 5.2). It is trivial
 
q 

fa
−1
3
θ m
to see that p = 1 − 1 − 2π , where θ = 2 sin
r + mπ
. This is because
2R
the target cluster is detected as soon as its outer boundary falls within the detection
radius of the robot [77]. The inverse sine expression can be simplified to obtain the
following two bounds:
3r
R
3r
3mr
≤p≤
2πR
πR
θ≥

(5.4)
(5.5)

Proof for Theorem 6 (1): If the target is not found, the robot travels for
2R/s units of time before reaching the collection zone again; otherwise, it travels for
expected 2R/(3s) units of time before finding a target cluster. Assuming only a single
robot in the system, recall that with probability p, the robot finds at least one target
cluster. This causes the expected search time for the robot to be the following:


∞
1X
2R
2R(3 − 2p)
i
Ts =
(1 − p) p 2Ri +
=
s i=0
3
3ps
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(5.6)
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Figure 5.3: Theory and simulation agree in the ordering of CPFA performance as a
function of arena size (N = 10, r = 0.2, f = 256, and m = 4). (a) Comparison
of theoretical predictions. (b) Simulations performed using the ARGoS simulator.
For large arenas SpiralCPFA performs much better than RandCPFA and better
than SpokeCPFA in simulation and in theory. For the linear fits R2 = 0.842 for
SpiralCPFA, R2 = 0.897 for SpokeCPFA and R2 = 0.841 for the RandCPFA.
All arena dimensions are given in meters.
Without site fidelity, then to find all f targets, the robot needs to make f such
identical and independent trips, resulting in a total search time of f Ts .
Now, observe that once a target cluster is found, the robot moves in a straight
line path to the collection zone, costing

2R
3s

units of time. Thus, the total transport

time taken by the robot to collect all targets in the arena is Tt =

2f R
.
3s

Adding the

total search time and the transportation time, we obtain the total foraging time for
RandCPFA to be Ttotal = f Ts + Tt =

2Rf (3−2p)
3ps

+

2f R
3s

=

2Rf (3−p)
.
3ps

This allows us to

bound the price of ignorance using Equation 5.1 as follows:

χ (RandCPFA) =

2Rf (3 − p)
3ps



3s
4Rf


=

3−p
2p

(5.7)

Using the lower bound on p from Equation 5.5, we obtain the the result as stated.
We obtain a tighter bound using a coupon-collector argument in Section 5.1.5.
However, it becomes non-trivial to extend this argument for the case of site-fidelity
and target depletion and hence, we continue the remaining proofs in this theorem
using the same technique as discussed above.

Proof for Theorem 6 (2): We say that the robot exhibits site fidelity ps ∈ [0, 1]
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if each time it finds a target at a particular site, it returns to that site for its next
trip with probability ps . Otherwise, it chooses a random direction to move. We then
denote χ(ps ) to be the price of ignorance given site fidelity ps .
Ignoring the effects of target depletion, the expected search time to find a target
cluster for the first time is the same as before. However, for each of the remaining
f
−1
m

targets in that pile, the robot takes in expectation ps (2R/(3s))+(1−ps )Ts units

of time. This is because the robot returns to the same location with probability ps and
performs a Ballistic search otherwise. Hence, the expected search time to completely
consume a target cluster with site fidelity is Ts +(f /m−1) (ps (2R/(3s)) + (1 − ps )Ts ),
which can be rearranged to (1+(f /m−1)(1−ps ))Ts +ps (f /m−1)(2R/(3s)). The transport time for these targets remains the same. Hence, the total expected time taken by
the robot to collect all the targets in the arena is (mps + f (1 − ps )) Ts +ps (f − m) 2R
.
3s
Using Equations 5.5 and 5.6, we show that the expected price of ignorance is at most

 1
m
m πR
1
−
, as stated in the theorem.
+
f
r
2
f

Proof for Theorem 6 (3): For mathematical simplicity, we perform our analysis
assuming only one target per pile (f = m) and no site fidelity (so that each robot
collects m/N piles in expectation). We begin with computing how the probability
of finding target clusters degrades as they are depleted. Let pn be the probability
that in a single trip of the robot, at least one target cluster is encountered, assuming
the arena currently has n unexplored target clusters. Then, pn ≈

nθ
2π

(when θ is

sufficiently small compared to 2π/m). Given this value of pn , the (expected) search
time is at most

2R(1+2pn )
3s(1−pn )

to find a single target cluster. Thus, to find the time to

search for all the m/N target clusters, we use an integral approximation and assume
N < m to obtain the following (here Tsdepl denotes the total (expected) search time
with depletion effects and qn = 1 − pn ):
m/N

Tsdepl

≤

X  2R(1 + 2pm−kN ) 
k=1

3s(1 − pm−kN )
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≤

8πmR2 ln 2
3rs

(5.8)

Using Equation 5.4, we obtain the following:
3N s
χ≤
4Rm



8πmR2 ln 2 2Rm
+
3rs
3N s


≤

(2π ln 2)N R 1
+
r
2

(5.9)

Proof for Theorem6 (4): Let pf be the probability of discovering the target
cluster in one Ballistic walk by the robot when the number of targets in the target
cluster is f . We know that pf = θf /2π, where θf has the same form as in Equation 5.4.
NoSF
Let Ts,f
be the expected time (without site fidelity) for as single robot to find the

target cluster when it has f targets. Note that a single robot collects 1/N fraction of
the total targets in expectation. Then, we obtain the following:

NoSF
Ts,f

=

f /N
X

NoSF
Ts,i

=

i=1

f /N
X
2R(3 − 2pi )
i=1

3spi

4Rf
≤
3N s




πR
−1
r

(5.10)

where the last inequality follows from the bound in Equation 5.5. Adding the effect of
site fidelity (where ps is the probability that the robot will return to the same location
that it last located a target), we denote by Ts,f (ps ) the expected search time in this
case. Then, we obtain the following:

Ts,f (ps ) =

NoSF
Ts,f

4Rf
≤
3N s

(f /N )−1 

+



X


2Rps
NoSF
+ Ts,i (1 − ps )
3s

i=1

πR
2Rf
2R
−1 +
−
r
3N s
3s

(5.11)

Note that the bound above holds for ps = 1 (perfect site fidelity). Adding the expected
transport time, this gives the upper bound on the total expected foraging time of
 2R
4Rf πR
− 3s . This causes the price of ignorance to be at most
RandCPFA as 3N
s
r
πR
r

−

N
.
2f

5.1.5

Tighter Analysis for RandCPFA

We now discuss a method for obtaining a tighter bound on the expected foraging
time of the RandCPFA, ignoring the effects of target depletion and site fidelity.
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of observed price of ignorance to the upper bounds derived
in Section 5.1. (a) Theory vs. simulation for RandCPFA showing the improvement
given by the analysis in Section 5.1.5. (b) Combination of Figure 5.3a and Figure 5.3b
focusing on the agreement between theory and simulation in demonstrating that the
SpiralCPFA performs better than the SpokeCPFA for larger arenas and matches
the theoretical predictions very well. All arena dimensions are given in meters.
Observe that in the proof for Theorem 6, we assumed that the expected time to
collect f targets is at most f times the expected time to collect a single target. In
this simplification, the robots may make multiple passes over the entire arena to
achieve complete collection.
However, observe that as soon as the entire arena is visited once, all targets would
have been collected and no further foraging is required. This allows us to use the
expected time to cover the entire arena as a tighter upper bound on the search time
for RandCPFA, compared to that obtained in Theorem 6.1. To obtain this bound,
we bound the number of distinct ballistic trajectories by

2π
,
θ

where θ is the same as

that in Equation 5.4. Since each trajectory can be traversed multiple times independently and identically, the expected number of times each trajectory is traversed at

2π
, which is obtained similar to the analysis of coupon
least once is at most 4π
log
θ
θ
collector problem [88]. The maximum time it takes to complete each trajectory is
2R
,
s

and hence, a tighter upper bound on the total foraging time is now at most


 2Rf
 2Rf
2R
4π
2π
8πR2
2πR
log
+
≤
log
+ 3s . This allows us to bound the price of
s
θ
θ
3s
3sr
3r

ignorance by 2πR
log 2πR
+ 12 , which is significantly lower that in Theorem 6.1 (see
rf
3r
Figure 5.4a for an empirical comparison).
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5.2

Experimental Methods

To validate the formal analysis, we ran experiments using the ARGoS simulator for
a variant of each algorithm implemented for a square arena with N = 10 robots.
The foot-bot robot, programmed to move like the iAnt robot from [62], was used for
all experiments. The experiments measured the time to complete collection in an
environment with f = 256 targets arranged in m = 4 clusters, of 64 items each,
placed uniformly at random in the arena. Five replicates were run for each arena size.
Robots were able to detect and pick up a target if they came within r = 0.2m of it.
For the RandCPFA experiments, the robot always use site fidelity (ps = 1). Results
from these experiments are shown in Section 5.3 Figure 5.3b.

5.3

Simulation Results

Figure 5.3a shows the relative price of ignorance for each algorithm given in Section 5.1. As predicted, our experiments show that SpiralCPFA has the lowest cost
of ignorance for large arenas with greater cost of ignorance for SpokeCPFA and
greatest for RandCPFA. We also observe that the variance in price of ignorance is
very low for SpiralCPFA in simulation whereas for SpokeCPFA and RandCPFA
the price of ignorance is highly variable, demonstrating that the performance of these
algorithms is sensitive to the placement of clusters.
Figure 5.4a shows that performance of RandCPFA in simulation closely matches
the tighter bound given in Section 5.1.5. Figure 5.4b shows that the simulation results
for SpiralCPFA match the formal analysis well. SpokeCPFA, however, performs
considerably worse than the theoretical predictions.
Two factors help to explain why simulation performs worse than the theoretical
bound. In the analysis, robots search different spokes on the outbound and return
trips, but in our implementation, each robot’s return spoke is the same as the outbound one, increasing search time by up to a factor of 2. Additionally, while the
theory assumes that transport of targets is equally divided among the robots, our
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Figure 5.5: Fraction of area explored by the robot over time. SpiralCPFA never
re-searches the same area, which reduces the price of ignorance.
simulations used a relatively small number of robots and clusters. Since the number
of clusters was smaller than the number of robots, the robots could not fully parallelize
the search.

5.4

Discussion

Our theoretical analysis and experiments in simulation help to explain the effectiveness of spiral algorithms observed in previous simulations and experiments with physical robots [49, 97]. Our simulation results are consistent with those predicted by
our formal analysis. We show that SpiralCPFA is expected to outperform both
SpokeCPFA and RandCPFA. We attribute this to the non-redundancy in the
search path of SpiralCPFA, where the robot continuously eliminates area to search
for targets with every step and no two robots have overlapping search areas. This is
not the case for SpokeCPFA which repeatedly visits points near the centre of the
arena . Overlap in search is even worse in RandCPFA since each successive ballistic
walk is made independently of previously foraged areas. We plot an approximation
of the fraction of area eliminated for search over time for the three algorithms in
Figure 5.5. We observe that RandCPFA ignores all previously obtained information
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Table 5.2: Summary of various analytical results in this chapter. See Table 5.1 for
notation. Ranked according to the least upper-bound on expected performance (lower
is better).

Algorithm

Rank

Collection Time

Price of Ignorance

Ideal

1

4Rf
3N s

1

2
√πR
2N rs

√
4 2Rf
3N s

−

2R
3s

+

3

πR2
N rs

+

4Rf
3N s

4

4πR2 f
3N rs

SpiralCPFA

2

SpokeCPFA
RandCPFA

−

2R
3s

3πR
√
4 2rf

−

3πR
4rf
πR
r

N
2f

+

√

2

+1

−

N
2f

and performs each ballistic walk as if it were foraging in a completely unknown arena.
On the other hand, SpiralCPFA shows a monotonic increase in the information
gained about what parts of the arena do not contain any more targets and chooses
never to traverse those areas again. SpokeCPFA increases more slowly over time
due to overlap near the centre.
The theoretical analysis reveals why target depletion and site fidelity are important
to consider in RandCPFA. As targets are collected, clusters become smaller and it
becomes more challenging for the robots to find them. To the best of our knowledge,
we make the first attempt to model the effect of depletion in collaborative foraging
and prove that when target depletion is taken into account, one can expect the price of
ignorance to increase with N . In RandCPFA a larger number of robots on one hand
collect targets faster (by working in parallel), but they also deplete the arena at a
rate which significantly slows down foraging as time progresses. The counter-intuitive
result that the price of ignorance increases with N is because the omniscient algorithm
pays no cost for search, while RandCPFA pays an additional cost as clusters shrink
and therefore become harder to find. Site fidelity compensates for target depletion
because robots only have to find each cluster once. This is evident in the analysis
because when both site fidelity and depletion are accounted for, the price of ignorance
no longer increases with N (compare Theorem 6.3 with Theorem 4).
Thus, our analysis shows that site fidelity strongly counteracts the effect of target
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depletion which greatly improves performance of RandCPFA. Empirically, target
depletion makes finding targets exponentially more difficult over-time [61]. Site fidelity has been observed to improve foraging performance in stochastic algorithms in
simulation and in biological field studies [46, 85, 76, 62]. Our formal analysis explains
this phenomenon and suggests that site fidelity may be an important component of
stochastic foraging algorithms more generally.
The effect of target depletion is further exacerbated in simulation because robots
may bore a ‘tunnel’ through the clusters, resulting in two smaller clusters that must
be rediscovered before all resources can be collected, an effect not explicitly captured
by our formal model. We note that the deterministic algorithms considered in this
chapter are resistant to this effect of target depletion by design. This is because the
search trajectories cover the entire arena in a fixed time and do not revisit previously
foraged areas while searching for more targets. Thus, when targets are depleted, they
have no effect on the time taken by ongoing search for other targets.
The theoretical results presented in Table 5.2 allow us to not only quantify the
efficiency of each algorithm, but also help us to understand the relative impact of
search cost and transport cost. We provide insight into how site fidelity, a common
strategy among social insects [85], mitigates the effect of target depletion on foraging
time. Our analysis helps quantify the importance of keeping oversampling in search to
a minimum, which is an argument in favour of deterministic search for limited-memory
systems.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Open Problems
For two party IC, we have described an algorithm for sending a message over a twoway noisy channel. Our algorithm is robust to an adversary that can flip an unknown
but finite number of bits on the channel. The adversary knows our algorithm and the
message to be sent, but does not know the random bits of the sender and receiver,
nor the bits sent over the channel. The receiver of the message does not know the
message length in advance.
Assume the message length is L, the number of bits flipped by the adversary is T ,
and δ > 0 is an error parameter known to both players. Then our algorithm sends an




expected number of bits that is L + O T + min T + 1, logL L log Lδ , and succeeds
with probability at least 1 − δ. When T = Ω(L) and δ is polynomially small in L,
the number of bits sent is L + O (T ), which is asymptotically optimal; and when
T = o(L/ log L), the number of bits sent is L + o(L).
Many open problems remain including the following. First, can we determine
asymptotically matching upper and lower bounds on the number of bits required for
our problem? Our current algorithm is optimal for T = Ω(L), and seems close to
optimal for T = O(1), but is it optimal for intermediate values of T ? Second, can
we tolerate a more powerful adversary or different types of adversaries? For example,
it seems like our current algorithm can tolerate a completely omniscient adversary,
if that adversary can only flip a chosen bit with some probability that is 1 −  for
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some fixed  > 0. Finally, can we extend our result to the problem of sending our
message from a source to a target in an arbitrary network where nodes are connected
via noisy two-way channels? This final problem seems closely related to the problem
of network coding [78, 83, 16], for the case where the amount of noise and the message
size is not known in advance. In this final problem, since there are multiple nodes,
we would likely also need to address problems of asynchronous communication.
For multiparty IC, we have described the first algorithm in interactive communication for n players that deals with the case of unknown number of bits sent by the
protocol, while tolerating an unbounded but finite amount of noise. Against an adversary that flips T bits, given an δ ∈ (0, 1), our algorithm compiles a noise free protocol
P that sends L bits into a robust protocol P 0 that succeeds with probability 1 − δ,



 
)
and upon successful termination, sends O L 1 + α1 log n(L+T
+
T
bits, where
δ
α is the average message length in P. The blowup in the number of bits is constant
for long messages in P and within logarithmic factors of the optimal, otherwise.
Several open problems remain including the following. First, can we adapt our
results to interactive communication where P is a synchronous protocol? Second, can
we handle an unknown amount of stochastic noise more efficiently, while making no
assumption on the value of L or T ? Finally, for any algorithm, what is the minimum
number of private random bits required to be hidden from the adversary to achieve
robustness?
For ANTS, we presented the GoldenFA for which the expected number of time
steps required to locate a shape of diameter D, placed adversarially at a distance



2
log
L
, where t < N is the number
L from a central location, is O L + L N(t+1)
D
of searchers that experience (adversarial) crash failures during the algorithm. We
proved that our algorithm is asymptotically tight for the class of spoke-algorithms –
ones that search only via line segments emanating from the central location. In our
design of this algorithm, we used the Golden Ratio to efficiently handle (1) unknown
D by decreasing the total runtime by spreading out the spokes uniformly; and (2)
arbitrarily many crash failures.
100

An interesting open problem is to develop a non-spoke-based algorithm that removes the logarithmic terms in our search time, but is still robust to failures and
does not require advice. Fibonacci spirals are quite commonly used in nature for
space-filling applications, so they may be useful for this open problem.
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